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Announcements

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The Australasian Catholic Record

A Quarterly Publication under Ecclesiastical Sanction

"Pro Ecclesia Dei." St. Augustine.

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Nihil Obstat :

RICHARDUS COLLENDER,

CENSOR DEPUTATUS.

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Official Documents

SUPREME SACRED CONGREGATION OF THE HOLY OFFICE.

Proscription of Books.

During the last months of 1940 and the first seven months of 1941, the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office condemned and ordered to be inserted in the Index of Prohibited Books the following works:—

KARL PELZ, Der Christ als Christus.

This book was condemned on October 30, 1940, and, notification was given of the author's humble submission dated January 10, 1941.

WOLFGANG STROOTHENKE: Erbpflege und Christentum.

The condemnation is dated February 19 and 20, 1941; the decree was published two days later.

LUCIEN LABERTHONNIERE: Etudes de philosophie cartésienne et premiers écrits philosophiques.

This is a posthumous work of the author, edited by L. Canet. Its condemnation is dated March 26 and 27, 1941. The decree bears the date March 29.

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Under the same date the Holy Office issued the following warning about censorship of Books:

"Since it has often happened that books published with the permission of local Ordinaries have, in consequence of a decree of the Holy Office, been withdrawn from sale as being prohibited books, the Congregation earnestly exhorts Ordinaries and religious Superiors to proceed cautiously in this matter and not grant permission to publish, unless they have received a favourable verdict from censors really competent to examine the books and expert in the matters dealt with."

GEORG KOEPGEN: Die Gnosis des Christentums.

MATTHIAS LARQS: Das christliche Gewissen in der Entscheidung
(printed for circulation as a manuscript.)

HERMAN MULERT: Der Katholizismus der Zukunft.

These three works are condemned by judgment given and confirmed on May 7 and 8, the relative decree bearing the date May 16, 1941.

QUERIES

regarding the cautions in mixed marriages.

Wednesday, May 7, 1941.

At a general meeting of the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, the following queries were proposed:

1. Whether the validity is assured of a marriage celebrated between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic party certainly not baptized, with a dispensation from the impediment of disparity of cult, if the non-Catholic party alone gives the cautions prescribed in accordance with canon 1061 1, n.2 (c. 1071) of the Code of Canon Law.

2. Whether the validity is assured of a marriage celebrated between a Catholic party and a non-Catholic party certainly not baptized, with the same dispensation, before the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law, if the non-Catholic party alone gives the cautions; and, in so far as the answer is negative to 1 and 2.

3. Whether such causes of nullity of marriage are to be treated according to canons 1990-1992 of the Code of Canon Law, or before a collegiate tribunal in the ordinary process of law.

Their Most Eminent and Reverend Lordships, the Cardinals entrusted with the safeguarding of matters of faith and morals, having heard the views of the consultors, decreed the following answers:

To 1 and 2: No, unless the Catholic party has at least implicitly given the cautions.

To 3: *No* to the first part; *Yes* to the second, unless in a particular case there is certainty about the requirements of canon 1990; and *ad mentem*.

The mind of the Sacred Congregation is this: Although the Holy See by immemorial practice has demanded and now also strictly demands that, in fulfilling the conditions, in all cases whatever of mixed marriage, the caution be given by formal promise, and that is required from both parties explicitly (cc. 1061, 1071), nevertheless, the use of the faculty of dispensing—whether it be ordinary or delegated—cannot be held invalid if both parties, at least implicitly, give the cautions. That is to say, they are required to place those acts from which one must conclude and from which it may be established in the external forum that the party knows the obligation of fulfilling the conditions and has manifested a firm resolve to satisfy that obligation.

On the following Thursday, the eighth day of the same month and year, our Most Holy Lord Pius XII., by divine Providence Pope,

in an audience granted to the Most Reverend Assessor of the Holy Office, heard the above resolution of the eminent Fathers, approved it, confirmed it and ordered it to be published.

Given at Rome, from the Palace of the Holy Office, May 10, 1941.

J. PEPE, *Acting Notary, S.S.C.H.O.*

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SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE ORIENTAL CHURCH DECREE

whereby the faculty of granting change to another Rite is henceforth reserved to the Holy See.

In view of maintaining more firmly the discipline which binds each faithful Christian to the Rite in which he is born, our Most Holy Lord, Pius XII., by divine Providence Pope, in an audience of November 23, 1940, at the report of the undersigned Cardinal Secretary, deigned to ordain that the faculty of passing from one Rite to another is to be granted by the Holy See alone.

Hence the faculty enjoyed by Apostolic Nunzios and Delegates in virtue of the Decree "Nemini licere" of December 6, 1928 ceases, and to this Sacred Congregation judgment is directly reserved in regard to all those things which refer to change from one Rite to another, whether there be question of clerics or of faithful.

Everything to the contrary notwithstanding.

Given at Rome, from the Palace of the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church, November 23, 1940.

E. Card. TISSERANT, *Secretary.*

J. CESARINI, *Assessor.*

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SACRED CONGREGATIONS OF RELIGIOUS AND OF SEMINARIES AND UNIVERSITIES DECREE

on admission of subjects to a Seminary or Religious Family.

The following is a joint decision taken by the Sacred Congregation of Religious and the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities:

In the case of any persons who have belonged, under any title, to a Religious Family, recourse must be had to the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Studies, before they can be admitted to a Seminary. The Ordinary of the place shall await the judgment of the said Congregation, which shall inform him of its decision, when all matters relative to the case have been examined.

Similarly, in the case of those who for any reason have left a Seminary, before they are received into any Religious Family, the Religious Superiors must have recourse to the Sacred Congregation of Religious, which shall inform the Religious Superiors of its judgment, when all matters relative to the case have been examined.

The above ordinances were approved by our Holy Father, Pius XII., who also confirmed this decree and ordered its publication.

Given July 25, 1941.

J. Card. PIZZARDO, *Prefect.*

G. RUFFINI, *Secretary.*

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SACRED CONGREGATION OF RITES.

St. Michael the Archangel Patron and Protector of Radiologists and Radium-therapeutists.

Amongst the wonderful inventions of the present age, radiology and radium-therapy occupy a conspicuous place. The former is a powerful means of scrutinizing the secrets of nature and bodily organs, and both together make possible the cure of very serious and otherwise incurable diseases. It is, however, an invention the use and exercise of which is fraught with no small danger to the experts who apply it; and, consequently, it is becoming that all three classes, namely, radiologists, radium-therapeutists and their patients should have special help from Almighty God. The Angels and Saints should be invoked as intercessors for them by the Christian people.

Hence the President of the Italian Society of Medical Radiology, in the name of nearly all the Radiologists of Italy, has humbly petitioned the Holy Father to have St. Michael the Archangel declared and appointed Patron and Protector of Radiologists.

His Holiness, therefore, on the report of the undersigned Cardinal Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, welcomed this request and graciously deigned to declare and appoint St. Michael the Archangel Patron and Protector of Radiologists and Radium-therapeutists. The Holy Father wishes the Christian people to have him, whose help we experience against the wickedness of the devil, as a solace also in our infirmities.

Everything to the contrary notwithstanding.

Given at Rome, from the Sacred Congregation of Rites, January 15, 1941.

† C. Card. SALLOTTI, *Prefect.*

A. CARINCI, *Secretary.*

THE CUSTODY OF THE B. EUCHARIST.

The Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments in an exhortation dated February 10, 1941, again draws attention to the directions given in 1938 on the custody of the Blessed Eucharist. In case of sacrilegious theft, the process on the whole matter of this sacramental stewardship must be immediately made and forwarded to the Sacred Congregation.

FACULTY TO PRIESTS IN DETENTION.

By concession of the Sacred Penitentiary, under date of February 22, 1941, priests in concentration camps or such public places of detention may hear the confessions of persons likewise detained in the same places, provided such priests had jurisdiction for sacramental confessions from their own Ordinary and were not deprived of it.

OFFICE OF INDULGENCES.

Indult concerning pious exercises continued for a month.

Our Most Holy Lord, Pius XII., by divine Providence Pope, in an audience granted to the undersigned Cardinal Major Penitentiary, on February 15 of the current year, gracious deigned to issue the following ordinance:

The Sacred Congregation of Indulgences on July 18, 1877, laid down certain regulations regarding a pious exercise continued for a month in honour of St. Joseph, particularly that the exercise can extend over a monthly space from any particular date of a particular month. The same applies to other similar exercises in Churches or public or semi-public oratories, as often as it is opportune to close them on a feast day which is not the last day of the month, whether the reason be the greater facility of going to Holy Communion or any other just cause. In such circumstances the pious exercise can begin on any date of the month usually celebrated, or of the preceding month, the continuation of the exercise for thirty days being observed.

Everything to the contrary notwithstanding:

Given at Rome, from the Palace of the S. Penitentiary, March 10, 1941.

L. Card. LAURI, *Major Penitentiary.*

S. LUZIO, *Regent.*

PAPAL COMMISSION
FOR THE AUTHENTIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CANONS OF THE CODE.

ANSWERS TO QUERIES (April 8, 1941.)

The Eminent Father of the Commission for the authentic interpretation of the Canons of the Code, discussed in plenary session the following queries and ordered answers to be given as hereunder:

On Funeral Rights.

Query: Whether under the words of canon 1223 §1: *clerici ipsi ecclesiae addicti*, there come also the capitulars, as such, of a Cathedral or Collegiate Church.

Answer: No.

On the separation of husband and wife.

Query: Whether the causes of separation of husband and wife are to be numbered amongst the causes which never become a *res iudicata*, of which mention is made in canons 1903 and 1989.

Answer: Yes.

FURTHER ANSWERS (August 5, 1941)

on the precedence of Metropolitans.

Query: Whether according to the Code (canon 106, n.3, 272, 280, 285, 347) an Archbishop who is a Metropolitan takes, as being a Metropolitan, precedence outside his province of an Archbishop who is not a Metropolitan and has no suffragan Bishops.

Answer: No.

On Secret Archives.

Query: Whether the words of canon 379 § 1: *retento facti brevi summario cum textu sententiae definitivae*, refers only to causes which have been concluded ten years ago by a condemnatory sentence, or also causes whereof the persons arraigned have died.

Answers Yes to the first part, No to the second.

A Modernist and the Virgin-Birth

Summary: Dr. Cadoux's attack on the Virgin-Birth—*Galatians* and *Romans* exclude the doctrine?—Joseph's 'legal' paternity—texts from *John*—Testimony of Ignatius of Antioch—Mark's silence—The genealogies and 'legal' descent from David—The reading of Mt. 1. 16 in the Sinaitic Syriac—the Ebionites' denial of the Virgin-Birth—The Virgin-Birth in Luke 1. 34, 35—Mary does not doubt, but is surprised at the angel's message—Meaning of "I know not man"—"The throne of David his father"—Positive arguments for authenticity of Luke 1. 34, 35—Whole context supposes Virgin-Birth—"His 'parents'"—The "criticis'" method of attack—"They understood not the word"—Authenticity of Lucan Protevangelion—The Sinaitic Syriac again—Significance of above examination.

No full reply, so far as I know, has yet been given to Dr. Cadoux's *Catholicism and Christianity*,¹ and it is not hard to understand an apologist's reluctance to deal with those seven hundred packed pages of criticism. However, in the meantime, it will do no harm to examine a few of those pages, though the isolating of a section of the work means that Dr. Cadoux must be met on the ground of literary criticism alone.

I intend to examine part (pages 348-351) of chapter xvi, which the author has entitled 'The Mother of Jesus.' These pages deal with the Virgin-Birth of Our Lord, that is, with the doctrine that excludes human paternity in the conception of Christ.² Whilst not denying this doctrine outright, Dr. Cadoux gives what he regards as "the chief grounds" on which "many Christians" regard the Virgin-Birth as "historically doubtful or even in all probability untrue."

At the outset, Dr. Cadoux concedes that the Virgin-Birth of Jesus "can claim the unequivocal support of the Gospel of 'Matthew'," and "in some sense at least that of Luke also"; and that it is "emphatically professed by Ignatius...and by the earliest forms both of the eastern and of the western Creeds." Yet, "the historical evidence strikes so many candid and reverent enquirers as insufficient to make Virgin-

¹Allen & Unwin, 1928. The work has for sub-title: A Vindication of Progressive Protestantism. Dr. Cadoux was, at least when his book was published, Professor of New Testament Criticism, Exegesis and Theology, and of Christian Sociology, in the Yorkshire United Independent College, Bradford, England. He has published several theological and historical studies. The fundamental thesis of *Catholicism and Christianity*—"the ultimacy of the Inner Light"—was refuted in *The Month* (Dec., 1929) by Father Robert Hull, S.J., who had also replied in the previous July issue to the Doctor's criticism of the Tridentine decree on Tradition. These two essays are included in the volume of Father Hull's collected essays: *Medieval Theories of the Papacy*, Burns Oates, 1934.

²The Doctor also, further on, states his opinion that the presumption is against Mary's perpetual virginity. This aspect of the Catholic doctrine is outside the scope of this article.

Birth more probable than normal birth." First of all: "*As a whole*, the New Testament ignores it. There is no trace of a knowledge of it in Mark, or Peter, or Paul, or 'John'."

Criticisms of this kind are made against various Catholic doctrines. But the writers of the New Testament did not write to order of the Modernists and 'higher critics', nor is there any reason why a given doctrine should be expressly taught throughout the whole of the New Testament. For the Gospel is the 'good news' of salvation, and the preaching of that salvation did not require that the miraculous conception of Christ should be stressed. The 'critics' so often fail in a sense of proportion.

In an endeavour to support his general argument, Dr. Cadoux appeals to particular texts.. "Paul," he says, "speaks of our Lord as 'born of a woman, born under the Law' (Gal. iv. 4) and as 'born of the seed of David according to the flesh' (Rom. i. 3*)," and he asks "Could he have so written, when actually dealing with the Divine Sonship of Jesus, if he had known of and accepted the doctrine of His Virgin-Birth?" The answer is Yes. For the Virgin-Birth cannot be adduced as a proof in itself of the divinity of our Lord. Of its very nature it could come within the personal experience of Mary alone, and so it had necessarily to be an object of faith to others, for example, to the Christians of Rome. To adduce the Virgin-Birth as a proof of the divinity of Christ would not have reinforced, but rather overloaded, the fundamental doctrines proposed in the Apostolic catechesis.³ It is only by ignoring this rather obvious fact that the critics can work up an argument for their thesis from St. Paul. Moreover, the Christological doctrine of St. Paul was already widely known when Matthew and Luke published their accounts of the Infancy, and had there been in these accounts any real conflict with Paul's doctrine or with the living belief of the early Christian Church, so tenacious of its Faith, it is incredible that these stories should not have gone the way of so many apocryphal gospels.

In detail: The use of the word 'woman' (*guné*) does not exclude virginal conception, as is clear from Mt. i. 20 and 24, where the word is used in a passage that teaches in unambiguous terms the Virgin-Birth. Indeed, St. Paul's argument would perhaps have been strengthened could he have adduced human paternity in Christ's generation.

³Cf. Léonce de Grandmaison in *Etudes*, CXI, p. 515.

The phrase from Romans—"born of the seed of David according to the flesh"—gives no more support to Dr. Cadoux's argument. Both Matthew and Luke insist on the Davidic descent of Jesus, yet they hold that He was born without the co-operation of Joseph. They do not regard the Virgin-Birth and Davidic descent as incompatible, and so we cannot argue that St. Paul's words exclude a supernatural conception. Nor does the phrase "according to the flesh" mean that Christ was conceived in the normal way: St. Paul is speaking of our Lord in His human nature.

Dr. Cadoux stigmatizes as "arbitrary" the attribution to Joseph of merely legal fatherhood, by which alone Jesus should be 'son of David'; but the exclusion of legal paternity is itself quite arbitrary. Paul was not concerned with Jesus' birth as such, but with His Messianic dignity. Jesus was the heir of David, but among the Jews legal descent could give the same rights as natural descent, as we see in the 'levirate' law (Deut. 25, 5-10). Joseph's marriage, of course, was not a 'levirate' one, but his legal relation to Jesus was something far more real than the legal paternity of the dead brother: Jesus was born of Joseph's lawful wife, and so He was a true descendant of Joseph, who was of the House of David, as the Evangelists insist. Therefore, even in the hypothesis—which I am far from granting—that Mary was not descended from David, her marriage with Joseph made her Child heir to "the throne of David, His father" (Luke i. 32).⁴

"The Fourth Gospel," Dr. Cadoux goes on to argue, "makes not only the Jews (vi. 42; cf. Mt. xiii. 55) but Jesus' own followers (i. 45) refer to Him as Joseph's son, and nowhere corrects them." Why should they be corrected? The evangelist is giving the speaker's own words, and Jesus certainly passed for the son of Joseph. As for our Lord's "own followers," Dr. Cadoux is clearly straining a point. It was Philip alone that spoke of our Lord as "son of Joseph," and the context suggests that he had been a disciple of Jesus no more than a few hours. To try to build a case on these texts is a confession of weakness. Further, the author of the fourth gospel—John the Apostle, as we may quite reasonably hold—knew the first and third gospels, and he who loved the truth so passionately would certainly have corrected them had he considered them wrong in teaching the Virgin-Birth. In many points he supplements the Synoptics,

⁴Cf. Durand in *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique*, III, pp. 324-327.

and he repeats only where necessary. By bringing out so clearly the divinity of Mary's Son, John gave a sufficient testimony to the Virgin-Birth. For, as Père d'Alès has remarked on this subject, "la divinité a ses exigences."⁵ Dr. Cadoux, of course, shrinks from arguments based on the fitness of things, but against the cavils of the Modernist we may well appeal to the Christian sense, so unerring in those that have made the spirit of the Gospel most their own. Nor does this sense tend to override evidence or to create legends; for its very reverence forces it always to respect the Revelation once given.⁶

The Virgin-Birth, as Dr. Cadoux admits, is "emphatically" professed" by Ignatius of Antioch. Now, Ignatius must have been familiar with John's doctrine and spirit, and his reverence for the authority of the Apostles would restrain him from making a daring innovation. Even if Dr. Cadoux will not admit that the fourth gospel was written by St. John, nevertheless Ignatius of Antioch remains a witness to Apostolic teaching. It is worth while quoting him:—

"There is only one physician, flesh and spirit, born (in time) and (yet) existing before time, God incarnate, in death true life, (born) of Mary and of God, first possible then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord" (*Ad Ephesios*, vii. 2).

"Our God Jesus Christ was borne in the womb of Mary according to God's plan, of the seed of David indeed, but also of the Holy Spirit..." (*ibid.*, xviii. 2).

"The prince of this world did not know of the virginity of Mary and her child-bearing..." (*ibid.*, xix. I).

"...firmly believing in our Lord, truly a descendant of David according to the flesh, Son of God according to the will and power of God, truly born of a virgin..." (*Ad Smyrnaeos*, i. 1).

Turning to the second gospel, we may ask is it true that "there is no trace of a knowledge" of the Virgin-Birth in Mark? The "critics" like to forget that in Mark Joseph is non-existent: Jesus is simply "the son of Mary" (vi. 3). The fact that Matthew gives in the parallel "the carpenter's son" (xiii. 55) and Luke "Joseph's son" (iv. 22) would seem to indicate that Mark, having omitted all account of the infancy, here chooses his language carefully. Mark's scope is to prove Christ's mission from God, and he does this from the 'public life.' He had no occasion to record the Virgin-Birth. Nor, I repeat, can the

⁵*Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique*, 1926, III, 131.

⁶*Le Christ*, Bloud et Gay, p. 257.

Virgin-Birth be a proof of the divinity of Christ: *the miraculous conception must itself be proved.*

Dr. Cadoux, in his endeavour to prove that in the early years of the Church "belief in the Virgin-Birth was not by any means universal," next turns to the genealogies of Christ. The trend of his argument is that there existed "a belief that Joseph was His (Jesus') real father." Thus, the genealogies of Joseph are presented as those of Jesus; He and Joseph are both described as descended from David, whereas Mary's descent is not given; and the oldest Syriac version is "an intrusive witness of a real belief in Jesus' normal birth." For the sake of argument, let us suppose that both genealogies are genealogies of Joseph, and, to avoid being accused of resorting to a "pure expedient," let us waive the question whether Mary was of the House of David. Then, if Joseph was not the "real father" of Jesus, he was His 'legal' father. This, as I have already remarked, is not an "arbitrary assertion." Not only Matthew but Luke also—as we shall see—clearly teaches the Virgin-Birth, and yet both, as we are supposing, give Joseph's genealogy. To accuse them of inconsistency in this is itself quite arbitrary. Matthew certainly knew, and Luke would have realized, that in the patriarchal society of Israel descent could not go through the mother. Therefore, if Jesus was heir of David at all, it was through Mary's husband that His descent must be traced. To say that Joseph's descent "could have interest only for those who believed that Jesus was really his son" is to overlook the fact that, even though Mary were of Davidic descent, her lineage was of minor importance. For it could give Jesus His physical descent from David, *but it could not of itself alone make Him heir to David's kingdom.* Matthew is, indeed, all but explicit on the point: "Jacob begot Joseph, *the husband of Mary*, of whom was born Jesus" (i. 16). Clearly he is intimating that Jesus is the son of David through Joseph's marriage to His mother. Luke has said the same thing in another way: "Jesus...being—as was supposed—the son of Joseph" (iii. 23). To stigmatize this interjected qualification as an "awkward parenthesis" is to ignore the fact that the preceding chapters in Luke allow us to hold that he took the legal paternity for granted and was here even drawing attention to it. The parenthesis is awkward indeed for the theory that Joseph was the "real father" of Jesus.

And now the Sinaitic Syriac version rises to subvert my argument? It reads: "Jacob begot Joseph; Joseph, to whom was betrothed Mary the Virgin, begot Jesus, who is called Christ." Dr. Cadoux has to

admit, of course, that this Syriac version "as a whole...does not deny the Virgin-Birth." But, still, it seems to him an "intrusive witness of a real belief in Jesus' normal birth," and perhaps it reflects the source used by the evangelist. Certainly, official records, to which the evangelist might have had recourse, would naturally attribute the paternity of Jesus to Joseph. But this would in no way indicate the existence of a belief, consciously held as such, contrary to the Virgin-Birth, and it is a mere shift to imply that a governmental document could witness to a belief of this kind. Of course, there was a "belief" that Joseph was the "real father" of Jesus—a "belief" that the canonical gospels make no attempt to hide. During Jesus' life the secret of His supernatural conception was known perhaps to Mary and Joseph alone. When the Gospel began to be preached, this miracle could not be put forward as a proof either of Jesus' divine mission or of His personal divinity. Nevertheless, the faithful seem to have been instructed on this point, and the apparently contradictory statements in the gospels can well be attributed to the evangelists' knowledge that the faithful knew the truth about the birth of Jesus and that they could be trusted to understand what was said.

The suggestion that this Syriac version gives us the original text of Mt. i. 16 can be classed as absurd. The reading stands alone; it occurs in a palimpsest of the 4th/5th century, and so is not necessarily the text of the original (early) version; it contradicts the context, which retains v. 18 of Matthew i., and it incorporates in itself a testimony to the belief in Mary's virginity. On the other hand the MS evidence for the traditional reading of Mt. i. 16 is overwhelming. Only a desire—conscious or unconscious—to find evidence against the Virgin-Birth could make anyone work up a "case" for this heterodox reading of the Sinaitic Syriac.

Enter now the Ebionites, many of whom denied the Virgin-Birth. These sectaries were "professing Christians of Jewish origin dwelling in Palestine" and "they were closely connected with places and circles where Jesus was personally known." Their disbelief does not disprove the Virgin-Birth, "but it is the less easy to account for it, if really cogent evidence for it was available in the first century." This argument breaks on the same rock as a previous one. Only Mary herself could have "really cogent evidence" for her miraculous conception. To *all* others the miracle must be an object of faith, and every human will is free to reject the motives of belief. One might as well argue:

Cerinthus and the Ebionites did not believe in the divinity of Christ; this does not disprove His divinity, but their disbelief is the less easy to account for, if really cogent evidence for Christ's divinity was available in the first century. Further, those Ebionites who denied the Virgin-Birth held that Christ became Messiah at the time of His baptism by John. One doctrinal error led to another,⁷ and there is no need to represent the Ebionites as "professing Christians...closely connected with places and circles where Jesus was personally known." This is very like special pleading, and even if the Ebionites did inherit a tradition opposed to the Virgin-Birth, the truth of this tradition would still be in question.

Dr. Cadoux next takes up chapters i and ii of St. Luke's gospel. These chapters "*in their present form* certainly support the Matthaean assertion of Virgin-Birth but the support is far from being unequivocal, and there are several suggestions of a parallel belief in normal birth..." I have already commented on this "belief in normal birth" and will defer consideration of the examples that Dr. Cadoux adduces here, and also of the implication that we do not possess a trustworthy text of Luke's narrative. After another tilt at, "the awkward parenthesis in iii. 23," the Doctor proceeds to assert that "the only Lucan passage that can be quoted as affirming the Virgin-Birth is i. 34, 35. These verses do not *explicitly* mention the miracle; and, unless they are interpolated, the mention of 'the throne of his father David'...would suggest that they do not imply it." These verses are also "difficult on independent grounds."

First, then, let us examine the criticisms directed against these two verses, then the assertion that Luke's support of Matthew is "far from being unequivocal," and, finally, the various difficulties.

Verses 34 and 35 of chapter i "do not explicitly mention the miracle." Dr. Cadoux has committed himself to this statement, *italics included*. What is it worth?

St. Luke tells that "Mary said unto the angel, 'How shall this be, seeing that I know not man?'" First of all, to anticipate an objection, these words do *not* express *doubt*—Dr. Cadoux speaks of "Mary's doubt." Our Lady did not say "How *can* this be?," but "How *shall* it be?" She asked simply for information. Elizabeth, "filled with the Holy Spirit," praised her for her obedience of mind: "Blessed art thou who hast *believed*..." Zachary was stricken dumb for his

⁷Not, of course, by any intrinsic illation: the Son of God could have been incarnate through natural conception.

incredulity—"Whereby shall I *know* this?"—, and Elizabeth was plainly conscious that Mary had received Gabriel's message with dispositions quite different from Zachary's. Now, there is an element of surprise in Mary's question, and, as Lagrange has remarked,⁸ there are only two reasons why a woman betrothed should be surprised at being told that she is to have a son: her surprise is due either to her intention to remain a virgin or to an announcement that the conception is to occur immediately in the normal way. But there is nothing in the angel's words to imply that the conception must take place immediately. Mary, then, clearly implies her intention of remaining a virgin, but at the same time she seeks further information: Is it God's will that she should give up her resolution? *The angel's reply corresponds exactly to this state of mind*: he assures Mary that there is no question of conjugal relations: her child will be conceived by the power of God, by divine action in her. Could one desire any more "explicit" mention of the miracle?

To return to Mary's words: "I know not man." She is not simply excluding the past—the verb would have to be in the perfect tense for that—, she implies a state, an intention, a resolution, possibly a vow. Indeed, to interpret these words in any other way is to deprive her objection of meaning. Yet, at the same time Mary is not prepared to refuse obedience to God's will: if He wants her to have a child in the ordinary way,⁹ then she is quite prepared to put aside her preference **Messiah was to be born of normal conjugal relations.**

for virginity. This is a natural interpretation of the text and it reinforces the argument from Lagrange. It enriches, too, the meaning of Mary's final words to the angel: "Be it done to me *according to thy word*," and it explains why Luke insisted (i. 27) on Mary's virginity: "unto a virgin. . . , and the virgin's name was Mary."

But what of "the throne of his father David"? Does this phrase suggest that a miraculous conception is not expressed in verses 34-35? No; it merely gives us the clue to Mary's question: she took the phrase as implying full human parenthood, but the angel reassures her.¹⁰ He seems, indeed, to have deliberately prepared the way for her question.

This interpretation gives us a thoroughly consistent narrative, exquisitely delicate and artistic. Dr. Cadoux would lift the jewel out of the heart of it and then assure us that the setting looks quite well

⁸*Revue Biblique*, IV (1895), p. 175.

⁹She evidently understood the angel to imply in his opening words that the

¹⁰We may well see here a confirmation of the argument that Jesus inherited the kingdom of David by legal descent.

alone—"34 and 35 separate easily from the context, and leave it (if they *do* imply virgin-birth) self-consistent"!

It is to arguments of this kind that the "critics" have to resort in order to get rid of these verses; for they can produce no textual evidence in favour of their supposition that the verses are interpolated. It would be enough to answer their particular objections and dismiss their efforts as the product of prejudices, but it may be worth while setting out some positive arguments in favour of the authenticity of the verses in question.

First of all, we find that if we drop verses 34 and 35 we rob the succeeding two verses of most of their meaning. If Gabriel has merely been telling Mary that the son that shall be born in the ordinary way from her marriage with Joseph shall be the Messiah, then the mention of a miraculous conception, such as Elizabeth's, becomes pointless.

Again, there is in Luke's narrative an evident parallel between the annunciation of the Precursor and the annunciation of the Saviour Himself:—

there appeared to him an angel	the angel Gabriel was sent unto a virgin
Zachary was troubled at the sight	she was troubled at his word
Fear not, Zachary, for thy petition hath been heard	Fear not, Mary, for thou hast found favour before God
thy wife Elizabeth shall bear thee a son	thou shalt conceive in thy womb and shalt bring forth a son
thou shalt call his name John	thou shalt call his name Jesus
he shall be great	he shall be great
and shall be filled with the Holy Spirit	and shall be called Son of the Most High
himself shall go before him, . . . to prepare for the Lord a ready people	he shall reign in the House of Jacob for ever, and of his reign there shall be no end
Zachary said unto the angel, Whereby shall I know this?	Mary said unto the angel, How shall this be,
For myself am an old man	seeing that I know not man?
And the angel answered and said to him	And the angel answered and said to her
I am Gabriel, who stand before God	The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee
thou shalt be dumb	behold Elizabeth . . . she hath conceived

The only points peculiar to the second annunciation are the angel's salutation at the beginning and Mary's *Fiat* at the end. The angel's answer to the question is, of course, different; for the dispositions of the questioners were so different. Otherwise there is a consistent and striking parallelism: an angel appears to both, both are "troubled" and reassured, to each a son is announced, the angel gives the names these children shall bear and describes their future greatness and their mission, both Mary and Zachary question the angel and give a reason for their question, the angel replies by giving his credentials to Zachary and to Mary the information she asked for, and, lastly, a sign is given to both. To take away verses 34 and 35 is to wreck the parallel.

Further, if we examine the second passage carefully we find that there is in almost every point an advance on the preceding story. Right from the beginning we are told the name of the angel (whose dignity we already know), and twice Luke says that Mary is a virgin. Zachary is told that his prayer has been heard, but Mary is told that she herself is pleasing to God. In announcing the birth of a son, the angel implies that the first conception is to follow on normal relations between Elizabeth and Zachary, but speaking to Mary he makes no reference to Joseph. Indeed, the absolute way in which he announces: "Thou shalt conceive in thy womb and shalt bring forth a son," already foreshadows the miracle of verses 34-35. Again, John is to be "filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb," but Jesus shall be "Son of the Most High." The Precursor is to prepare the way of the Lord, but the Saviour inherits an everlasting kingdom. Now, if we drop the next two verses of the second account and pass immediately to the mention of Elizabeth's conception, we cannot escape a sense of anti-climax, an anti-climax foreign to the whole context and to the genius of the writer. But if you leave those two verses where the whole MS evidence puts them, then you find the story goes on naturally. Mary, the virgin who has found favour with God, asks how this announcement of a son is to be reconciled with her virginity. Her difficulty is not that she *cannot* conceive: she asks what precisely God wants her to do. The angel answered Zachary by accrediting his divine ambassadorship and striking the incredulous priest dumb. In sublime language Mary is assured that her virginity will remain secure in the overshadowing power of the Creator, and she is given the joyful news of her cousin's happy state. Here we have a corresponding advance on Elizabeth's miraculous conception: the story is complete

and has risen to its due climax. Even if we leave aside all theological considerations and ignore the unanimous MS evidence, to lay hands on verses 34-35 is a literary sacrilege.

Again, Dr. Cadoux would have us believe that "35" is simply a doublet or variant of 30-32." A strange objection! Verses 30-32 tell us the dignity and mission of the Child: *who* He shall be. In verse 35 we learn first, *how* He will assume human nature, then that His title Son of God will not merely express His greatness but also the particular mode of His incarnation. How "criticism" closes the mind!

Dr. Cadoux would whittle down Luke's testimony to the Virgin-Birth to "an awkward parenthesis" and the passage we have just considered. But the Virgin-Birth is the background of the first two chapters of Luke: given the clear statement of the Virgin-Birth in i. 34-35, then we see the whole context lit by this supernatural light.

Mary apparently leaves Nazareth immediately to visit her cousin: "Mary arose and went with haste into the hill-country..." There is no mention at all of Joseph, and St. Luke, with that refined delicacy that characterizes these chapters, allows us to understand that the angel's "word" had been fulfilled and Mary's precious Burden had come into being quite independently of St. Joseph.

Again, Mary is fully conscious of the wonder wrought in her: in replying to Elizabeth's praise of her obedience she rejoices that "He who is mighty hath wrought great things for me, and holy is His name." There is surely here an echo of the angel's words: "The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee"?

Mary's prophetic words: "Henceforth all generations shall call me blessed," seem to set Mary apart from Joseph. And yet the glory of the son is attributed primarily to the father.

Then, in ii. 5, St. Luke tells us that Joseph went to Bethlehem "with Mary his *betrothed*, who was with child." Does not the evangelist imply that Mary's relation to Joseph had not changed since the annunciation: the Child she bears is not the fruit of wedlock?

Of course, Dr. Cadoux objects that Luke speaks of Mary and Joseph as "the parents," "his parents," "his father and mother." This phrase, he says, implies "normal paternity," and, if Joseph were not the real father of Jesus, "ordinary consistency" should have restrained the evangelist's freedom of expression. First of all, is it not remarkable that Luke, unafraid as he is of speaking of Joseph as "father" of the Child, never in his own person calls Jesus the son of

Joseph. On the contrary, Luke presents Joseph to us as taking second place—a silent figure in the background. The shepherds, we are told, “found Mary and Joseph.” Simeon addressed himself “unto Mary his mother...” When Jesus is found in the Temple it is Mary that speaks: “his mother said unto him...,” though the father is head of the family. Twice Luke tells us: “Mary stored up all these things in her heart”; “his mother stored up all these things in her heart.” And how reminiscent of Matthew is this Lucan style: “they saw the child with Mary his mother”; “take the child and his mother”; “he arose and took the child and his mother.” On these latter words Jerome remarked very pertinently: “He did not say, ‘He took his son and his wife,’ but ‘the child and his mother,’ as though (Joseph) were foster-father, not husband.”

When on one occasion Mary put Joseph first—“thy father and I seek thee sorrowing”—her words are met with an implicit correction from the twelve-year old Boy: “I must needs be in my Father’s house.” Once Luke does himself say “his father and mother marvelled,” but he may there well be implying that it was Joseph that marvelled most.

Dr. Cadoux is prepared to concede that “it is certainly striking that, whereas, in the story of John the Baptist’s birth the father is more prominent than the mother, in the story of Jesus’ birth the mother is more prominent than the father.” A beggarly alms! How the text puts this miserable concession to shame! Contrast “Thy wife Elizabeth shall bear thee a son” with: “The angel Gabriel was sent from God...unto a virgin betrothed to a man named Joseph...and the virgin’s name was Mary... ‘Thou shalt conceive in thy womb’... ‘I know not man.’ ‘The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee...’ ‘Be it done to me according to thy word.’ ‘Henceforth all generations shall call me blessed.’ Mary his betrothed was with child... They found Mary and Joseph... Mary stored up all these things...Simeon said unto Mary his mother... They found him in the Temple...His mother said unto him... And his mother stored up all these things in her heart.”

We may well ask, just why do the “critics” want to excise the Virgin-Birth from the third gospel? Is it out of pure devotion to the truth? If that were their motive they might well start from the formal teaching of Matthew, interpret in the light of this what to them seems obscure in Luke, and then admit frankly that the alleged

silence of Mark, John, and Paul does not exclude the Virgin-Birth, whilst the doctrine is taught emphatically by immediate successors of the Apostles, in the life-time of people, extremely tenacious of tradition and vigorously opposed to innovations, who could check the origin of the teaching and judge its authenticity. But the "critics," and Dr. Cadoux after them, begin by invoking John, Paul, and Mark against the supernatural conception of Jesus, then they whittle away Luke's testimony, and finally, with a less uneasy conscience, they rise to the assault on Matthew. These "candid and reverent enquirers" are not convincing!

What, then, are we to say in direct reply to the fact that Luke speaks of Mary and Joseph as Jesus' "parents," His "father and mother"? Luke, having clearly taught the virginal conception of Jesus, when he comes to relate incidents that occurred after His birth, takes it that his readers will have understanding enough to see in what sense he uses these phrases. Why should he have resorted to round-about expressions? He took the terms ready to hand, which were, after all, the terms which had to be used in the home of Jesus. No doubt, even the exacting Professor Cadoux, having once defined a term for his students, proceeds, without further flutter, to use it in the sense he has given to it? Again, these expressions may well be taken as a proof that among the Jews legal paternity gave real rights over a child, and it may be claimed that their mere use, in the context of a document that teaches the Virgin-Birth, confirms what I said above when dealing with the genealogy of Joseph.

Dr. Cadoux could find a further inconsistency in "Luke's statement in ii. 50 that Joseph and Mary did not understand Jesus' assertion that He must be in his Father's house. This comes strangely after all the wonderful intimations they are said to have received in connection with His birth." But *what* precisely has this to do with the *manner* of His birth? Nothing at all! Jesus has appealed to His divine Sonship in order to show that His action was not an arbitrary ignoring of the rights that Mary and Joseph had over Him and He thus recalls to them—"Did you not know..."—the fact that He has a mission to fulfil. How that mission was to be fulfilled, what exactly it involved in the life of Jesus and in His relations to them, *that* Mary and Joseph did not understand.¹¹

Thus, Dr. Cadoux's attempts to find "inconsistencies" in the early chapters of Luke's gospel are due to superficial exegesis, refusal to

¹¹Cf. Lagrange in *Revue Biblique*, IV (1895), p. 182.

face the full evidence, the creation of artificial antinomies, and so forth. Behind this attack on Luke's consistency is the assumption that the text of these two chapters has undergone change: Dr. Cadoux speaks of "our ignorance of the exact process by which the Lucan Protevangelion attained its present form..." We can sympathize with the ignorance of the "critics." Luke's story is far too well done for the "critics" ever to rise above their ignorance and give any convincing proof of "inconsistency" in the text as it stands. Their very endeavour to put Luke at variance with himself shows how little support textual criticism gives to their theories. Dr. Cadoux does, in fact, make one appeal to MS evidence in ii. 5: "the old Sinaitic Syriac and three manuscripts of the old Latin version read, 'instead of 'Mary who was betrothed to him,' 'Mary his wife'—a reading which is indirectly supported by several other authorities who give 'Mary his betrothed wife,' and which is quite likely to be original." The appeal to the Sinaitic Syriac is not a happy one. In an attempt to get away from the traditional reading of Matthew i, 16 Dr. Cadoux appealed to the same version. There the traditional reading "Joseph, the husband of Mary" became "Joseph, to whom was *betrothed* Mary the Virgin," and here in Luke "Mary his *betrothed*" became "Mary his *wife*." This reversal of readings would shake any but a modernist's faith in the departures of the Sinaitic Syriac from the traditional reading. Very probably both changes are the result of earlier departures. Some scribe or translator found "husband" hard to reconcile with the Virgin-Birth in Matthew. In Luke "betrothed" seemed opposed to Matthew, in which Joseph was ordered by the angel to take Mary into his house, that is, to complete the marriage ceremony and make her fully his wife. Neither innovator sensed the meaning of the evangelists. The genesis of the other variations is as easy to divine, and there seems no reason at all for dignifying some of their originators as "authorities."

My examination has covered only four pages of Dr. Cadoux's book, but the results of my criticism reflect seriously on the work as a whole. If a "candid and reverent enquirer" must have recourse to so many careful choices and superficial arguments, if he must steer his way so nicely through evidence and concentrate so often on details whilst blissfully ignoring their context and the character of the whole narrative—if he must do all this when questioning just one Catholic doctrine, we may be reasonably sure that a careful examination of his attack on other truths will yield a not very dissimilar result.

J. A. PHILLIPS, S.J.

Rural Education in our Catholic Schools

FLIGHT FROM THE LAND AND ITS CAUSES.

The manifesto of the Rural Movement sets forth in a few pages the principal causes of the evil which have come upon agriculture in Australia. It gives first place to what it calls the loss of economic independence among rural communities,—and that is the cause which, under one aspect or another, has been given closest attention up to the present. But this is not the only cause of the flight from the land. For that loss of independence is, in its turn, the result of other evils—evils which enter more deeply into the fabric of human society as we see it to-day. And of these other evils, there is one which is of paramount importance. It is an outlook on life and work which is at once pagan and materialist. It looks on men as beings made only for such pleasure as this world can give. It looks on work, and in particular on agriculture, as a drudgery to be endured only because it will enable us to earn money with which we can buy luxurious idleness.

We notice this materialist outlook because we can trace to it that thoughtless exploitation of the land which has had such disastrous results. If we are to save agriculture it is necessary that we should remedy this evil and restore the true Christian outlook among the farming community. It is, above all, important that we should preserve our children from this state of mind, and give them an education which will fit them for life on the land. That is why we turn to the problem of education, to examine the present system, to see what is vicious in it, and to indicate in a general way how our own Catholic Schools can achieve the ideal of rural education suited to boys and girls whose vocation is the land.

NATURE OF EDUCATION.

It is necessary at the beginning to state the true nature of all education. It consists in the training and the preparing of a man for life. In youth a man is as soft as wax to be moulded for good or

Editorial Note: This article is the substance of a paper that was read at the Second Rural Conference of the Catholic farmers of Central Queensland, held at St. Brendan's College, Yeffoon, in January, 1942. It has been suggested that it would be of interest to readers of the *Record*, because of the importance of education in the N.C.R.M.

evil; and the work of moulding a boy to a preconceived ideal is what education really is. By it we strive to reproduce in each individual person the ideal of perfect manhood, we strive to form the child into a man who will measure up to the plan which God had in creating him. And since, in God's plan, all of this life is but the stepping stone to the eternal glory of heaven, it follows that the child must, in the first place, be taught how to use this life so as to gain that end. That is the fundamental reason why religious training must occupy the first place in all true education. The perfect man is, and must be, the religious man. But religious training alone, no matter how complete, does not exhaust the idea of true education. For besides the one ultimate end for which we are created there are also secondary ends which are realised in this life. We have, all of us, received a vocation to work, to take our place in the world, in its fields, in its markets, in its shops and factories. Every boy has a vocation to spend his life in one form or another of human activity:—and, since education is a training for life, it follows that the education or training given to a boy must be determined by the particular form of human activity he intends to take up when he grows to manhood. All education must be practical, in the sense that it will fit a boy for what he has to do in after life, that is, it must be vocational.

And so, we have the two essential qualities of education: it must be religious and it must be vocational. Pius XI has said that there can be no true education which does not take into account man's last end—so, too, there can be no true education which does not take into account man's life in this world.

TWO EVILS IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

Passing over the question of religious training which does not concern us here, let us examine the educational system as we find it to-day. Measured in the light of what we have said, we find two evils in the present system. The first is that the system does not seem to recognise the need that every boy has for some form of vocational training. True, that need is recognised in some instances. We insist that our priests, doctors and lawyers be given a long period of specialised training which is almost entirely vocational. But outside what are called the professions, the attitude seems to be that no training is necessary, or, if some should be needed, that it will take care of itself. This attitude is especially evident in the vocation which concerns us, the vocation to agriculture. Agriculture and all its allied

trades are largely ignored by those responsible for our schools and are left to those boys who fail to be admitted into the public service, insurance companies and the law. As the Rural Manifesto expresses it:—the first evil we find in the educational system is its failure to inculcate the sense of vocation into the work of individuals. Indeed, it refuses to grant the dignity of vocation to all but a few of the various modes of human activity.

The second evil derives from and aggravates the first. Not only does the system not recognise the need for vocational training for everyone, but such training as our schools do give concentrates wholly on the needs of the city and industrialism. As a result, the many factors causing the abandonment of the land are reinforced. The life of the city, with all its shallow glitter, is held up before our children at their most impressionable age, and we cannot wonder that only a small minority find their way back to the land. And such few as do come back, return having received little or none of that specialised training needed for their vocation. Quite recently, in one of our college annuals, there was an article which manifested this evil in a striking way. It was an article pointing out the advantages of secondary education, urging boys to continue their studies through the junior examination up to the senior. As reasons for this continued study it gave two: first, that such study was either necessary or useful for entry into the public service; second, that it was necessary for entrance into the university, so that one might become a doctor, a lawyer, or a dentist. The attitude adopted by this magazine was even more marked than what it said. Quite clearly, it was assumed that any boy who wished to be anything, who wanted to be counted as a distinguished past-pupil, had to become a business man or a member of one of the professions. It was made clear, too, that the college was interested only in such boys, and in this it is typical of our whole secondary system. It concentrates almost entirely on the needs of the city, and by encouraging boys to seek after the positions which the city has to offer, the system shows that it is in perfect harmony with the present-day materialist outlook on life. Closely allied to this attitude on the part of our schools is a similar one common among parents. It seems to be the common opinion that professional men, business men, office boys and public servants are something above the rest of the world which works in the fields or carries on a trade. Among country families, one frequently finds that great sacrifices are made to send into a profession or business any boy who possesses

ability above the ordinary. You will hear it said that it would be a pity to condemn such a one to the life on the land. Implicit in such an attitude is the suggestion that the farm is no place for a bright boy, but it is good enough for the duller ones.

SUGGESTED REMEDIES.

What can be suggested by way of remedy for these evils?

We should begin with ourselves. As we have said, many fathers and mothers, infected, no doubt, by the above erroneous outlook, think that the best thing they can do for their children is to send them into the city. We must fight against that attitude, against this false kindness, and try to get people once more to realise the essential nobility of rural life.

Then we must turn to our schools. We have seen that the present system makes little or no provision for the boy whose vocation is the land—and we have seen that all true education must be vocational. The priest studies in a seminary, the doctor in a school of medicine. The young farmer must study in an agricultural college—or at least in one which will provide him with the training suited to his vocation. To quote the statement of the N.C.R.M., the establishment of agricultural colleges is greatly to be desired, for it is only in such a college that boys can receive in full measure the training they need, not only the technical training, but also the cultural training which will give them the true Christian outlook on rural life. But we must confess that, however desirable and even necessary such colleges may be, the expense involved in establishing and equipping them is beyond the resources of many dioceses.

That difficulty makes it important that existing colleges and convents make some provision for the training of boys and girls for life on the land. At the moment, most of our Catholic schools do not make any attempt at such provision—their whole care seems to be for the scholarship, the junior and senior examinations. There are indeed several rural subjects which count in these examinations, but these subjects do not form part of the curriculum in our schools—at least, one never sees them advertise the fact that one of their pupils got so many “A” passes in these subjects. Yet they do advertise their successes in—for instance—the public service examinations. Our Catholic boarding colleges are supported principally by boys from country districts, and surely it is but reasonable that the course of studies should include some subjects in which country boys would

naturally be interested. They give courses in languages, in ancient classics, in the higher mathematics; surely they could also include such subjects as principles of agriculture, animal husbandry and horticulture. It is not suggested that languages and all that are not excellent—they should not be neglected. But they should be given their proper place, which is a secondary place. For the boy who is to go on the land—and our colleges should encourage boys to go on the land—rural subjects are an essential part of his education. For him they are just as important as moral theology is to the priest. Therefore, those responsible for the course of studies in our secondary colleges should give serious consideration to the rural subjects set for the public examinations. They are supported largely by country boys; they should make adequate provision for such boys. If they neglect to do that, then they are neglecting the essential vocational element in education.

But they should not be satisfied with this—they should also give the boys a basic training in the handling of the ordinary tools and machinery, and, where possible, each school should have its own vegetable garden, managed by the boys under the supervision of their teachers.

In secondary schools for girls, the same general principles should apply. Use should be made of the subjects allowed by the State educational system, and in addition there should be training in the home arts and crafts—keeping in view all the time the special position of the woman in the home.

For primary schools it is more difficult to make practical suggestions—although it is here that suggestions are most necessary, for in our country districts we have only such schools, taught by nuns. An obvious suggestion would be to modify the present readers and textbooks, so that from their earliest years the children would be given a proper outlook on rural life and be prepared for the more definite training of the secondary school. In these, too, it would not be over-difficult to have a school garden.

D. HAWE.

St. Alphonsus and Probabilism

In the decree "*Urbis et Orbis*," March, 1871, conferring on Saint Alphonsus the title of "Doctor of the Church," Pope Pius IX. declared: "Not only had he written against Jansenism and other heresy and mischief, defended the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin and the Infallibility of the Holy See, recently defined, but by his Moral Theology he had opened a sure path between the too lax and too rigid opinions of theologians, a path which all may follow without fear of going astray."

In view of this and other authoritative declarations to the same effect, the moral system followed by the Saint became at once a matter of very special interest to writers and students of Moral Theology. The result has been that various conclusions have been arrived at, and still the question is a subject of controversy. Some are convinced that all his moral teaching is based on pure probabilism. Thus, for example, Noldin: "The Church has never explicitly given approval to Probabilism; but she has made her mind perfectly clear on the subject, by the very special approbation which she has given to the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus. Now the moral system which St. Alphonsus followed in the composition of his Moral Theology was simple probabilism." (I. p. 241). And Ferreres, in support of probabilism, says: "The Sacred Congregation of Rites has solemnly declared that Professors and Confessors can follow all the opinions of St. Alphonsus; but the Saint taught true and genuine probabilism—*verum et germanum probabilismum*." (I. p. 122). Other authors find it difficult to come to any definite decision on the question. Thus Genicot-Salsmans: "Utrum S. Doctor puris probabilistis an aequo-probabilistis sit accensendus obscurior quaestio est." (I. p. 70). Fr. Davis sums up the position as follows: "St. Alphonsus certainly seems to have passed through several stages of thought in the matter, concluding, as it is supposed, by being a firm and convinced equiprobabilist. However, that may be, for there is some doubt as to the exact meaning of his terms, this great theologian has had followers of insight and erudition who have adopted Equiprobabilism, and have persistently rejected the milder system." (Vol. I, p. 86).

The purpose of this paper is to show that the moral system finally adopted by St. Alphonsus was unquestionably that of Equiprobabilism. Much of the difficulty experienced in the past in this matter, has been

overcome by the publication in recent times of (1) "The Moral System of St. Alphonsus" (Gaude), and (2) in the centenary edition of his works, "Letters, Special Correspondence" (2 Vols. 1897).

1. ST. ALPHONSUS A PROBABILIORIST. 1726-1736.

It was in the year 1723, after eight years of practice at the Bar, that St. Alphonsus finally resolved to give up his profession as an Advocate. There is abundant evidence to show that he had been eminently successful as a lawyer. His sensitive conscience, however, made him at times feel uneasy, and this feeling increased, the more experience he had at the law courts. He often spoke of his doubts and misgivings to his more intimate colleagues. "Our profession," he used to say, "is a very dangerous one. A man's very conscientiousness may lose him his case. Ours is an unhappy life, and we run the further risk of an unhappy death. This career does not suit me, and I shall certainly leave it one day to save my soul."

In the October of the same year, 1723, he laid aside his secular dress, and began his studies for the Priesthood. A little more than two years afterwards, December, 1726, he was ordained priest.

At the beginning of the 18th century Probabiliorism was flourishing. The Popes of the period gave it their patronage. It was ably and vigorously defended by many of the best theologians of the day, notably, by the Dominicans. It owed, however, not a little of its prestige to its rival. Probabilism had in recent years suffered much from those of its own household. There had been a perfect riot of laxism. Opinions were put forward as probable which were absurd, ridiculous, and even immoral. Pope Alexander VII., in condemning forty-five of the most extreme of these propositions declared, that he could not see without deep sorrow, the spread of a multitude of relaxed opinions, to the great detriment of souls. The object of the condemnation, he added, was to safeguard the way of salvation which Our Lord had declared to be a narrow one, and to prevent its being made broad, and the faithful led into the road of perdition.

When St. Alphonsus began his ecclesiastical studies, Rigorism held sway in Naples. This was the system he learned from his Professors. He tells us himself: "When I began to study Moral Theology, my masters being of the rigid school, I undertook to defend the same with great ardour; but at close quarters, when I considered the question better, the teaching which favours the equally probable opinion appeared to me morally certain, since it flows from the principle that a doubtful

law cannot induce a certain obligation." Not only a close examination of the system, but his experience in conducting missions, convinced him of the objections to rigid moral principles. He saw that rigorism was attended with the double disadvantage of multiplying sins and hindering conversions. He turned then to Probabilist authors for more practical and milder teaching.

II. ST. ALPHONSUS A PROBABILIST. 1736-1762.

The authors he now began to study were principally Jesuits. In the preface to the first edition of his Moral Theology he mentions the following: Lessius, Sanchez, Viva, Suarez, De Lugo. The latter he always held in the highest esteem—"Doctissimus Lugo, qui, post D. Thomam non temere inter alios theologos facile princeps dici potest." It was not long, however, before he found that the study of Probabilism opened the way to fresh difficulties. How was he to determine which opinions were truly probable and which were not? What of the less probable opinion in conflict with one which is certainly more probable? Could he in conscience follow an opinion held by others to be probable, but which seemed to him altogether unlikely." His mind being uneasy, he sought the advice of his director. The more he studied, however, the more his doubts increased. He was dissatisfied and disappointed at the unsatisfactory state in which Moral Theology certainly then was. He therefore resolved to do all in his power to place the science of Morals on a secure and firm foundation. To make a selection of opinions that should be truly probable, he submitted the thousands of questions which form the matter of Moral Theology to a minute examination. The result of his labours was the publication of two volumes of Moral Theology. In the preface to the work the Saint writes: "Reading a great number of authors, I have found some too indulgent. There can be no doubt that these theologians do an immense amount of harm to the Church. for the majority of those of a lax life follow their maxims. Others I have found too austere, taking no account of human weakness. Wherefore I thought it good to publish this new work, which amid opinions that are too lax, and those that are too severe, holds a middle way. That I might select on every question the opinions more conformable to truth, I have undertaken no little labour. For several years I have gone through nearly all the classical authors who up to this have written on the subject. Especially have I given careful attention to noting the teachings of St. Thomas. In the choice of opinions my great care was to prefer reason to

authority. I have laboured in the majority of cases to give my own decision, giving the just weight of greater, equal or less probability to each opinion."

It may be noticed here as characteristic of his moral writings, that St. Alphonsus always attached the highest value to intrinsic probability. He often repeats the statement made above: "My great care was to prefer reason to authority." Answering Fr. Patuzzi, his Probabiliorist opponent, he writes: "You say I have embraced my way of thinking, through undue attachment to the Jesuits. Read my Moral Theology, and you will see that I have embraced a number of opinions contrary to the opinions of Jesuit authors. *I follow only my Conscience, and when reason convinces me, I pay little attention to moralists.*"

We can form some idea of the enormous labour involved in preparing this edition of his Morals when we learn that it contains 80,000 quotations from 800 authors.

In the following letter he announces to his Venetian publisher, Remondini, that he is about to send the first volume of the work:

Nocera, February 15th, 1756.

Most Illustrious Sir,—I take this opportunity of informing you that I am about to send on the work. I have just finished all the necessary arrangements.

At the end of this letter I have placed some important remarks for the reviser, proof-reader and compositor. Again I recommend you not to give my book for revision to any theologian of the Rigorist school (such as are nowadays, for the most part, the Dominicans), for I am not of the opinion of that school. I hold a middle course. I would much prefer to have a Jesuit Father revise the work if this could be done, for these Fathers are truly masters in Moral Theology. Indeed, the Jesuits of Naples are unanimous in publicly commending my book. Only a few have said that in certain points I am too rigorous. But, I repeat, the golden mean, or middle course, pleases me best."

In a postscript he adds: "I would moreover advise you to use good paper and clear type; for I have heard much dissatisfaction expressed that the Theology of Father Zaccharia appeared on poor paper."

In this edition, St. Alphonsus shows himself to be a Probabilist to this extent: (1) In regard to the existence of the law; and (2) when there is question of the cessation of the law, when the law has been probably complied with. He refrained from giving any decision on the central probabilist doctrine, namely, that it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion in favour of liberty where the opinion in favour of the law is more probable. He writes: "I have no intention of ex-

amining in this work whether we may follow a less probable opinion in presence of a more probable one. This controversy, which has been going on for the last two centuries, and is debated more than ever in our own time, has considerably exercised the pens of the learned, who, in my view, have given us less light than heat on the subject. I do not, therefore, treat of this question." But although he refrained from giving a decision on the point, in the work itself we find that he does not admit as probable in practise an opinion in conflict with one that is evidently more probable. In the conclusion of the preface he writes: "But, dear reader, I wish to warn you not to think that I approve opinions simply because I do not reprove them. Moreover, when there are two conflicting opinions, and I call one of them more probable, without pronouncing as to the probability of the other, or even when I employ the formula "non audeo damnare," I do not by that mean to admit it as probable, but to leave the decision to those who are wiser than myself."

III. ST. ALPHONSUS AN EQUIPROBABILIST. 1762-1787.

In order to show quite clearly that St. Alphonsus was an Equiprobabilist for the last 25 years of his life, we shall deal separately with the propositions which set forth the Equiprobabilist system.

A—When conflicting opinions with regard to the existence of the law are equally or nearly equally probable, one may follow the opinion in favour of liberty—*Lex dubia non obligat*.

Directed against the Probabiliorists, the doctrine here stated is now admitted by all theologians. At one time in high favour, as we have seen, Probabiliorism ceased to exist as a system when the works of St. Alphonsus were approved by the Church. In a letter to Father Blasucci, C.Ss.R., the Saint writes on this subject:—

I believe that I have clearly demonstrated the principle that a doubtful law does not oblige; for, as St. Thomas says, and all theologians affirm, a law not sufficiently promulgated does not oblige. When there are two probable opinions confronting each other, it is not the law that is promulgated, but only the doubt whether the law exists or not. When, therefore, the two opinions are equally probable, the law does not oblige, since it is doubtful.

"Before my book appeared, this point was obscure; now, however, everyone confesses that it is as clear as daylight."

(Letter 217 Special Correspondence.)

B—When conflicting opinions with regard to the cessation of a definite law are equally probable, or nearly equally probable, *standum est pro lege*.

For a time St. Alphonsus followed the teaching of Probabilism on this question. But in the sixth and subsequent editions of his Theology he writes as follows:

"If anyone *probably* judges that he has already satisfied the obligation of a vow, is he still bound, notwithstanding this, to fulfill it? Many deny, because, as they say, since the obligation of the law in that case is doubtful, possession of the law is also doubtful. Formerly I considered this opinion probable, relying rather on extrinsic than intrinsic probability, but having studied the question better, I now consider the opinion to be not at all probable, *minime probabilem*. The Reason: because since the vow is certain, liberty remains bound by the obligation until the vow is certainly fulfilled."

(Lib. I. 26seq).

It is not necessary to add that what is said about the obligation of a vow, applies to all cases where the law is in possession, such as the Divine Office, Confession of sins, etc.

C—When the opinion in favour of the law is certainly or notably more probable than the contrary, it is not lawful to follow the less probable in favour of liberty.

As we have already seen, before the year 1762, St. Alphonsus had come to no decision on the question whether one may follow a less probable opinion in presence of one more probable. In a dissertation published in that year he gave his final verdict on the matter. There he laid down the doctrine to which he adhered for the remainder of his life: "There are two questions that we propose to examine in this treatise: The first, whether it is permissible to follow the less probable opinion; the second, whether in a case in which the two conflicting opinions are of equal probability, it is allowable to follow the less safe. With regard to the first question we shall quickly dispatch it, as the solution is certainly evident. We affirm that it is not allowable to follow the less probable opinion where the opinion in favour of the law is notably and surely more probable. In answer to the second question, we affirm that where the opinion which is less safe is equally probable it may be licitly followed."

The two propositions contain, strictly speaking, the system of Equiprobabilism, taught and followed by St. Alphonsus without any change until his death in 1787.

In the letter quoted above to Father Blasucci he explains the meaning of the terms *notably* and *certainly* more probable:

"When the opinion in favour of the law is certainly more probable, I affirm that one is not allowed to follow the less certain opinion. In

this I am opposed to the system of the Jesuits. When the rigid opinion is certainly more probable. I must follow it, for in that case the law is sufficiently promulgated for me, and is no longer doubtful, strictly doubtful, but doubtful in a broad sense which does not free me from the obligation of adhering to the law."

Another argument stressed by the Saint in support of this doctrine is as follows:

"I say first, that if the opinion that stands for the law should seem to be certainly more probable, we are absolutely obliged to follow it; nor can we then embrace the opposite which stands for liberty. The reason: because to act licitly we must, in things that are doubtful, seek out and follow the truth; but where the truth cannot be clearly discovered, we are held to embrace at least that opinion which comes closer to the truth, which is the more probable opinion." (L. I. 54 seq).

In this case he will not allow the less probable opinion to be anything more than speculatively probable. In a letter to a Father of the Congregation at Pagani, he writes: "There can be no question that the Tutorists, with their rigorous system, are doing a great deal of harm; while, on the other hand, the Probabilists—I mean those who follow the opinion recognised as the less probable one, which, in my opinion, *is not at all probable*, since in that case the law is morally promulgated—the Probabilists, I say, cause the ruin of a great number of souls. The laxist confessors are certainly more numerous than the Rigorist." (Letter 185. S.C.).

Some writers have suggested that any modifications made by St. Alphonsus in his opinions were brought about for reasons of diplomacy. The storm against the Jesuits was raging at the time, and he was afraid that his works might share the fate of the books of the Jesuits. The suggestion, besides being altogether unworthy of the Saint, has no foundation whatever in fact. His moral system was the result of prayer, and of deep conscientious convictions as he assures us himself: "On this subject I have read during the space of thirty years innumerable authors, Rigorists and Laxists, and I have continually besought God for the necessary light to fix a system which I might hold to, and not stray into error. At last, as I have declared at the beginning of this work, I settled on a system for myself." (Exposition of the author's system regarding the regulating of moral actions).

Remondini, his publisher, was in constant dread of seeing his works suppressed, and himself suffer considerable financial loss. We have

several letters of the Saint to re-assure him on the subject, for the reason that his doctrine is not that of the Jesuits. Thus in a letter of June 30th, 1768: "As to my system of Probabilism, it is by no means that of the Jesuits; for I do not admit that a person may follow an opinion recognised as less probable, as is affirmed by Busenbaum, La Croix, and almost all the Jesuits who admit the less probable opinion. A further argument in my favour is the fact that whilst in France they have consigned to the flames a great number of works composed by Jesuits, they have spared mine." (Letter 209 S.C.).

The following incident, related in the Life of the Saint by Fr. Berthe, shows clearly his mind on the subject of Probabilism. During the year 1756 he fell seriously ill. The doctors declared that the illness was mortal. "Now that I am about to appear before God," he said, "I feel no fear. The only thing that gives me trouble is that I once followed the probabilist opinions; but if I did act according to these opinions, I did so by order of my confessor, whom I was bound by vow to obey. I never had the intention of committing sin, of that I am certain." (Vol. I., p. 509).

Of the nine editions of his Moral Theology published during the lifetime of St. Alphonsus, four appeared after the year 1762, that is, after he had finally adopted Equiprobabilism. In these editions is to be found the true mind of the Holy Doctor, and his authentic teaching on probabilism.

It is obvious that the moral doctrine contained in these and deduced from the principles of Equiprobabilism, is the doctrine approved by the Church as *sana, tuta, probata*. The approbation of the works of St. Alphonsus, therefore, in no way furnishes an argument in support of Probabilism. On the contrary, the only valid conclusion to be drawn therefrom is this: that although the Church has not explicitly approved of Equiprobabilism, she has made her mind clear on the subject, by the very special approbation of the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus. Now the system followed by the Saint in the composition of his Moral Theology was unquestionably that of Equiprobabilism.

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Moral Theology and Canon Law

QUERIES.

NATURE OF A *SANATIO IN RADICE*.

Dear Rev. Sir,

As the result of a discussion, I have a difficulty which I would be grateful if you will solve:—

Our Lord put the sacrament of Matrimony in the keeping of the Church. From this it follows that when the Church legislates on marriage there is a natural and divine law binding everyone to observe such legislation. When, therefore, a Catholic attempts marriage in a Protestant church, he repudiates, by that very fact, the divine law, and from this it would seem to me to follow that a *Sanatio* of his marriage cannot afterwards be obtained as the divine law made him *inhabilem*, i.e., disqualified him, and there cannot be a *radix* to heal. On the other hand, the Appendix to our late Plenary Council, p. 142, indicates that a *Sanatio* is possible in the circumstances. How, then, can it be maintained that the Church's law prescribing the canonical form of marriage has divine sanction?

PASTOR.

REPLY.

Our correspondent is perfectly right in saying that Our Lord put the sacrament of Marriage in the keeping of the Church. He is equally correct in concluding that the canonical form of Marriage as prescribed by the Church has divine sanction. But he is not logical in concluding that, therefore, a marriage contracted otherwise than in accordance with the canonical form cannot be revalidated by a *Sanatio* because there is no *radix* to heal. This will appear evident when one understands properly what it is that really constitutes a marriage, what it is that the Church does when she invalidates a marriage because not contracted in the canonical form, and what it is that the Church does when she grants a *Sanatio*.

The *radix* of marriage, in other words the element which really constitutes a marriage, is the mutual free consent of the parties. Canon 1081 § 1 emphatically asserts this when it says *Matrimonium facit partium consensus . . . qui nulla humana potestate suppleri potest*. Now, when two persons attempt to get married in spite of a diriment impediment, even an impediment of the divine order, or when they attempt

to marry otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the Church, *i.e.*, otherwise than in the presence of the parish priest and two witnesses, their consent and intention to marry may be as absolute as if everything were completely in order. What, then, is the effect of the diriment impediment or of the non-compliance with the law of canonical form? This, that the act of the will which, according to the natural law would have been sufficient to constitute a valid marriage, is rendered inefficacious something after the fashion that a Will which, though really expressing the desire of the testator but not drawn up in legal form, is inefficacious and invalid in law. In both cases, the *radix*, the consent and will of the person is naturally valid, but it is rendered ineffectual by the positive law. On the other hand, when a *Sanatio* is given what happens? The Church which itself imposed the disqualifying law, dispenses from it in a particular case, and allows the naturally sufficient consent to have its natural effect without any further renewal of consent. From this it is evident that the Church could never give a *Sanatio* where no real matrimonial consent ever existed or where, though once existing, it had been subsequently revoked. It is evident, too, that the Church can grant a *Sanatio* only in the case of marriages invalid because of an obstacle or impediment of the purely ecclesiastical order, for, when the impediment is of the natural or positive divine order, *e. gr. ligamen*, the Church has not the power to dispense from it. Our correspondent's difficulty, it seems to us, arises from the fact that he thinks that, because Our Lord put the sacrament of Marriage in the keeping of the Church, every act of legislation by the Church on this sacrament not only has divine sanction but is formally a divine law. But this can be no more true in the case of the sacrament of Marriage than it is true of the other sacraments, which are equally in the keeping of the Church, or, in fact, of any other sphere of the mission divinely committed to the Church. The laws of the Church on all these subjects, except where they voice the natural law or repeat laws positively revealed by God, are purely positive ecclesiastical laws, venerable and sacred in themselves and imposing an obligation in conscience but, with all that, laws made by a human authority under the guidance of the same Holy Spirit, and laws from which, under the guidance of the same Holy Spirit, the Church can dispense. In the case, then, of a marriage contracted outside the Church, an ecclesiastical law, which invalidated the marriage, was violated, but the *radix* of the marriage, the consent, was there, and, as long as it

remains there, it can be made effectual by the very fact that the Church exempts that marriage from her nullifying law. When She does this, the marriage begins to be valid from *nunc*, i.e. from the moment the *Sanatio* is given, but as far as the canonical effects of the marriage are concerned, such as the legitimacy of offspring, it is regarded by a legal fiction to be valid *ex tunc*, i.e., from the beginning.



MAY A WOMAN KILL HERSELF TO PRESERVE HER CHASTITY?

Dear Rev. Sir,

In the event of an invasion of this country, would a woman be justified in taking her own life if she had solid reasons to presume that her chastity would be violated? There seem to be conflicting views on the question amongst the clergy, and an early discussion of it in the *Record* would be appreciated. As a matter of fact, it has come to my knowledge that in this very district there are women who have already secured poison with the intention of taking it themselves and giving it to their girls in the event of a personal attack on their virtue.

QUEENSLANDER.

REPLY.

There is no doubt but that a woman may lawfully expose herself to the danger of almost certain death in order to preserve her chastity. She may permit her death rather than suffer violation. Hence she may resist her aggressor unto death, and she may leap from a great height to almost certain death in order to escape from him in the act of aggression. In the circumstances, her act has two effects—the first is to escape from her assailant, the other her death. She wishes the one; she permits the other.

On the other hand, it is equally certain that a woman may never directly and intentionally take her own life, no matter what her motive may be. By doing so, she would violate the divine prohibition, "Thou shalt not kill," and do what is naturally and intrinsically bad. This is the teaching of Catholic theology, and, though at other times we would probably consider it superfluous to quote the text books in proof thereof, still, as the question seems to be exercising the minds of very many people at the present time, it may be well to give the statements of a few of the recognised authors. Noldin¹ says: "Therefore, it is

¹Vide Vol. II, n. 326, b.

not lawful to kill oneself even in order to avoid some very serious harm . . . and it would not be lawful for a virgin to take her own life in order to escape violation." Prummer² likewise: "It is certain that a virgin could not directly kill herself in order to avoid being violated." Lehmkuhl³: "It is lawful for a virgin, in order to avoid being violated, to throw herself to *certain danger of death*, provided it be not to certain death . . . for if death must result from her action, it would not be lawful for her." St. Thomas, too, has a similar statement in the course of a special article in the *Summa*⁴ on the general question: Is it lawful for anyone to kill himself? He deals *ex professo* with the whole question, and in his own dispassionate way places the negative reply beyond doubt. As is his wont, he puts forward, first of all, four reasons why suicide might sometimes seem to be lawful. These reasons are:

1. Homicide is a sin in as much as it is contrary to justice. But no one can be unjust towards himself. Therefore, suicide is not a sin.

2. Those who enjoy public authority can inflict capital punishment on malefactors. *Atqui* sometimes these very persons who possess the public authority are themselves malefactors. Therefore at least these can kill themselves.

3. Freely to expose oneself to a lesser danger in order to avoid a greater one is lawful, just as one may amputate an infected limb in order to save his whole body. But, sometimes, by suicide a man escapes a greater evil such as an unhappy life or the disgraceful shame for his sins. Therefore, in such circumstances, it would be lawful to kill oneself.

4. Samson killed himself, and yet he is regarded as a saint. Therefore, etc.

5. In the Second Book of Machabees, Chap. XIV., v. 41-42, it is narrated that a certain Razias killed himself, "choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble birth." Now, nothing that is done nobly like that and courageously is unlawful. Therefore suicide is not unlawful.

Contrary to these arguments, which he directly disposes of later, the Angelic Doctor lays down his thesis: "It is entirely unlawful to kill oneself and for a threefold reason":

²Vol. II, n. 115

³Vol. I, n. 737,2

⁴2^a 2^{ae} Q. LXIV, Art. 5

1. Everything naturally loves itself. For this reason everything tends to keep itself in being and resists whatever is corrupting. Therefore, suicide is contrary to man's natural inclination and contrary to the charity which obliges each one to love himself. Therefore, suicide is always a mortal sin because contrary to the natural law and contrary to charity.

2. Every part, as far as its existence is concerned, belongs to the whole of which it is a part. Now, every man is a part of the community. Therefore, as far as his existence is concerned, he belongs to the community, and, consequently, if he kills himself, he does an injury to the community, as Aristotle teaches in the Fifth Book of his *Ethics*.

3. Life is a gift of God to man and is subject to the power of Him *who kills and makes to live*...Whoever, therefore, takes his own life sins against God just as he who kills another's servant sins against the master of the servant, or just as he sins who usurps to himself judgment on a matter which does not belong to him. But, to God alone belongs judgment concerning life and death according to the saying in Deuteronomy (XXXII, v. 39): "I will kill and I will make to live."

With these cogent arguments from cold reason, St. Thomas will satisfy any thinking man that we are not masters of our own lives to dispose of them as we wish. We did not give ourselves life; neither can we take life away. He then proceeds to dispose of the four arguments given above, and, in doing so, throws further light on the question.

Reply to Arg. 1: Homicide is sinful not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is contrary to charity. And, in fact, when a man takes his own life he sins against both charity and justice—against charity because this virtue binds him to love himself; against justice in as much as he violates the rights of the community and of God.

Reply to Arg. II.: Those who enjoy the public authority can kill malefactors only in so far as they can judge their case and pass sentence of death on them. Now, no one can be his own judge, since the exercise of judicial power requires authority over the person on his trial; at the most one can submit himself to the judgment of others. Therefore, malefactors who possess the public authority cannot kill themselves.

Reply to Arg. III.: A man is master of himself in as much as he has free will. Therefore, he can dispose of himself only with regard to those affairs that are regulated by man's free will, namely, the affairs of this life. Now, the passage from this life to a happier one is not subject to our free will but to the divine power. Therefore, a man may not take his own life in order to pass to a happier one.

In the same way, he may not kill himself in order to avoid any miseries whatever of this life, as the last and most terrible of the evils of this life is death, as Aristotle proves in the Third Book of his Ethics. Therefore, to kill oneself in order to escape the miseries of this life would mean undergoing a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser.

Likewise, it is not lawful to kill oneself because of past delinquencies, both because the suicide does himself the greatest harm in depriving himself of time for repentance, and because it belongs to the public authority to pass sentence of death on malefactors.

So, too, it would not be lawful for a woman to take her life in order to escape violation by another. For she cannot commit against herself the greatest of crimes, namely, suicide, in order to avoid another's lesser crime . . . Fornication or adultery is not as grave a sin as homicide, and much more not as grave as suicide, which is the greatest sin because committed against oneself to whom love is particularly due. Moreover, it is the most dangerous sin because it leaves no time for repentance.

Finally, one cannot lawfully kill himself because he fears that he will consent to future sin. *Evil cannot be done that good may come of it.* Moreover, it is never certain that anyone will consent to future sin, for God is powerful enough to free us from sin, no matter how formidable the temptation may be.

Reply to Arg. IV.: As to the case of Samson, St. Thomas replies in the words of St. Augustine: "Neither can Samson be excused for killing himself with his enemies in any other way than by saying that the Spirit, who wrought miracles through him, secretly commanded him to do what he did." This same method of justification is advanced by him (St. Augustine) in favour of certain holy women who, in time of persecution, took their own lives, and yet their memory is honoured in the Church.

Reply to Arg. V.: It is a matter of fortitude, yes, when a man, for the sake of virtue and in order to avoid sin, does not shrink from death at the hands of another. But, to kill oneself in order to escape

other sufferings has only the appearance of fortitude—an appearance which led some men to regard themselves as very courageous when they took their own lives, and Razias seems to have been of their number. In reality, such an act does not reveal courage but rather weakness of mind on the part of one who is unequal to bear suffering, as Aristotle in his *Ethics* and St. Augustine in his *De Civitate Dei* point out.

The conclusion then remains in the words of St. Augustine: "*Thou shalt not kill—neither another nor thyself. For he who kills himself kills nothing but a man.*" It is understood, of course, that we have discussed the question entirely objectively, and it could well happen that a woman placed in the circumstances represented by our correspondent might take her life in good faith and, consequently, not be held responsible for her act before God.

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QUESTIONS CONCERNING CURATES IN PARISHES CONFIDED TO THE CARE OF A RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.

Dear Rev. Sir,

I. A religious community has charge of a parish, and, in accordance with the requirements of Can. 471, one of the fathers has been duly appointed to the position of Parochial Vicar. The other fathers in the house have diocesan faculties to preach and hear confessions, but none of them have formally been appointed curates by the local Ordinary as provided for in Can. 476. Now, my question is this: Can the father who is a Parochial Vicar give the other fathers a general delegation to officiate at marriages, say, in his absence, after the manner outlined in the Code

II. In the circumstances mentioned above, when there is question of appointing a curate, what would be the position if the religious superior did not consult the Parochial Vicar concerning the candidate he presented to the Bishop for appointment? Would the appointment be not only unlawful but also invalid?

RELIGIOSUS.

REPLY.

I. We must give a negative reply to the first question. Can. 1096 § 1 plainly says that "general delegations to officiate at marriage cannot be given except to *curates*, and, in their case, only for the parish to which they are appointed; otherwise the delegation is invalid." Now, the several fathers, of whom there is mention in the query, are

not curates in the legal sense, even though they have the faculties of the diocese to preach and hear confessions. To be formal curates, as ruled by Can. 476 § 4, they must be presented by the religious superior, *audito parrocho*, to the local Ordinary who, in fact, formally appoints them. Since, then, this formality has not been complied with, those other fathers are not curates, and, consequently, the possibility of a general delegation in their regard is indefensible. It would not be a valid argument to say that, since the parish is united *pleno jure* with the institute, the whole community and, therefore, each member thereof, has the care of the parish. For, though it be true that the parish is united *pleno jure* with the institute, and has thus become a religious parish of which the community has the *cura habitualis*, still "the actual care of souls exclusively belongs to the Parochial Vicar with all the rights and duties of the common law" (Can. 471 § 4).

II. In a previous issue¹, we dealt at some length with the import of the expression, *audito parrocho*, in reference to the appointment of curates. At that time, we had in mind the appointment of curates from the diocesan clergy to non-religious parishes, and we defended the opinion that consultation with the parish priest is prescribed for the lawfulness of the appointment, and not for its validity. There is no reason, as far as we can see, why we should hold a different view in regard to the appointment of curates to assist the Parochial Vicar in the care of a parish entrusted to religious. Consequently, if the religious superior failed to carry out the ruling of Can. 476 § 4, i.e., failed to consult the Parochial Vicar concerning the candidate he proposed to present to the Ordinary for appointment as curate, the omission would not invalidate the appointment.

JOHN J. NEVIN.

¹Vide *A.C. Record*, 1930, p. 59

Liturgy

I.—COMMUNION OF THE SICK ASSISTING AT MASS FROM GALLERY ADJOINING CHAPEL.

Dear Rev. Sir,

1. In the chapel of an institution for the aged and infirm poor there is a spacious gallery joined to the main building, and where invalids—some in wheel-chairs, others in beds—assist at the Holy Sacrifice. After Mass is over the chaplain takes Holy Communion to them on his way to the other sick-rooms. Now the question is this: Should the gallery be regarded—for the time being, at least—as a sick-room or infirmary, or as still a part of the chapel? If the former, would the initial prayers. “Pax huic domui,” etc., be commenced here; if the latter, would the same rubric be followed as that for giving Holy Communion outside of Mass in the chapel proper?

2. And, likewise, if the gallery were visited last of all, would the final prayers be said here, followed by the blessing of the ciborium, or be postponed till the priest arrived back to the altar?

CHAPLAIN.

REPLY.

It is probable that the gallery is so located that it would be permissible for the celebrant to bring Holy Communion to its occupants *during* Mass. It is, however, preferable to consider the gallery as a sick-room for purposes of distributing Holy Communion to the sick *outside* Mass. This is a more practical procedure, and, moreover, it seems to be in accordance with the rubrics.

In the first place, for the distribution of Holy Communion during Mass, the gallery may be regarded as part of the chapel, provided that the requirements of Canon 868 of the Code of Canon Law are fulfilled: “Sacerdoti celebranti non licet Eucharistiam intra Missam distribuere fidelibus adeo distantibus ut ipse altare e conspectu amittat.” (cf. Rit. Rom. Tit. IV., Cap. I, n, 17.) It is certain, then, that the celebrant of the Mass may leave the altar to distribute Holy Communion to the faithful, provided that they are not so far removed from the altar that he must lose sight of the latter.

Before the publication of the Code it was generally maintained that this practice was permissible even when the communicants were so located that the celebrant would lose sight of the altar, provided

that the voice of the celebrant offering Mass could be heard from that location. This teaching was based on a Reply of the S. Congregation of Rites given in the year 1874 to the General of the Order of St. John of God.

Question I. Is it permissible for the priest, after the Confiteor, Misereatur, Ecce Agnus Dei, Domine non sum dignus have been recited at the altar, to bring Holy Communion to the sick, carrying the Ciborium without using the Humeral Veil, but accompanied by two acolytes carrying candles, the umbrella also being used, if possible, especially if the sick are some distance from the altar?

Question II. Is it permissible to bring Holy Communion in the manner described above not only to the whole ward (valetudinarium) located partly in front of or partly behind the altar, but also to certain bedrooms such that, although the altar cannot be seen from them, the voice of the celebrant may be heard?

Reply: "Non obstat," provided that in carrying the Blessed Sacrament the umbrella is certainly used. (S.C.R., Dec. Auth. 3322.).

Some commentators maintain that in view of the terms of Canon 868, less freedom may now be conceded in this matter. It is required now, they say, that the celebrant be able to see the altar from the place in which Holy Communion is distributed. In this view the present discipline represents a return to the practice in vogue before 1874. That practice was based upon a Reply given in the year 1829.

Question: Whether at the time of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, in the administration of Holy Viaticum, especially in hospitals, it is permissible to leave the altar and proceed to the sick-bed, reciting meanwhile the psalm Miserere, as the custom is outside Mass?

Reply: In the negative in regard to the reciting of the psalm Miserere. Moreover, if the celebrant in administering Holy Viaticum during Mass must lose sight of the altar this administration is not permitted (C.S.R., Dec. Auth. 2672.).

Nevertheless, the law of the Code will reasonably bear the broader interpretation, provided that the place occupied by the communicants is morally one with the church or oratory. In that case, even though the architectural design forces the celebrant to lose sight of the altar, he may distribute Holy Communion provided that these communicants are able to hear his voice as he celebrates Mass. In practice, strange incongruities could arise if the contrary opinion were upheld. Thus the celebrant might be able to distribute Holy Com-

munion at the front of the gallery, but not to patients located at the rear of the gallery, where he would have to lose sight of the altar.

In view of this interpretation, which is supported by such an authority as Cappello, it is probable that the gallery described by Chaplain is so located that Holy Communion *may* be distributed there during Mass.

In spite of this, it seems advisable to consider the gallery as a sick-room, not as part of the chapel, when Holy Communion is taken to the sick outside Mass. The law which permits the celebrant to distribute Holy Communion there during Mass does not enjoin that this practice should be followed. It should be viewed rather as a relaxation of the usual requirements, a concession of which the celebrant may or may not choose to avail himself. Likewise, when Holy Communion is brought to the gallery outside Mass, the priest is not bound, in virtue of Canon 868, to consider it as part of the chapel. Apart from the practical advantages in considering the gallery as one of many sick-rooms, there is a certain virtue in performing the ceremony of Communion to the sick, for which the Ritual provides a special rite. The setting-up of the table for Holy Communion in the sick-room, the actions of the priest and the prayers incidental to the rite are calculated to provide spiritual assistance to the communicant.

2. Considering the gallery as a sick-room, the order of prayers should be as follows: If the priest goes first to the gallery and subsequently to the other sick rooms, he should recite in the gallery, the Pax huic domui, the Asperges, the prayer Exaudi, the Misereatur and Indulgentiam (in the plural), the Ecce Agnus Dei and Domine non sum dignus three times. He then administers Holy Communion with the formula Accipe frater (soror) or Corpus Domini, according as it is given as Viaticum or not. In the second and subsequent rooms he recites the Misereatur, Indulgentiam, Ecce Agnus Dei and Domine non sum dignus once. In the last room, after giving Holy Communion he says Dominus vobiscum and the prayer Domine Sancte in the plural. If some particles remain in the ciborium he raises the latter in his hands, covered with the ends of the humeral veil, and gives the blessing nihil dicens. He then returns to the altar reciting the prayers and giving the blessing as prescribed by the ritual. If in the case described by our correspondent, the gallery is visited last of all, this same procedure should be carried out.

II.—HUMERAL VEIL: CARRYING HOLY COMMUNION TO THE SICK: AT BENEDICTION.

Dear Rev. Sir,

1. When taking Holy Communion to the sick, is it correct for the priest to put on the humeral veil in the sacristy, and likewise, when he is returning, to keep it on until he arrives back in the sacristy? It is understood, of course, that no server is present.

Again, is it in order for the Sister who accompanies the priest to the sick to receive the veil from him on arriving and, likewise, to place it on his shoulders when he is about to return? Some priests keep on the veil all the time during the Communion. Is this correct?

2. Another point about the humeral veil is this: At Benediction, should the server after removing it from the priest's shoulders, immediately take it away to the side table, or should he wait kneeling until the Divine Praises have been said?

CHAPLAIN.

REPLY.

1. It is intended that the humeral veil should be worn at such time as the ciborium containing the Blessed Sacrament is being carried, for its purpose is to cover the hands when something is held in them. Strictly speaking, therefore, it should not be worn by the priest in going from the sacristy to the altar and vice versa. So it is, too, that the Ritual directs the priest to lay aside the humeral veil on arriving at the sick-room, and to resume it before raising the ciborium containing the Sacred Species to bless those present. It should then be laid aside again, on arriving at the next sick-room.

The Ritual, though, presupposes that clerics or acolytes are present to assist the priest who carries Holy Communion solemnly to the sick. They are envisaged as being present to assist the priest at the altar, on the way to the sick-room, in the sick-room itself. Thus, for instance, the Ritual prescribes that the umbrella should be borne aloft over the priest's head as he proceeds to the sick-room. It is natural, then, that in the absence of assistants a certain amount of improvising is a necessity. It seems that of several forms of improvisation which are in use, one is just as commendable as another.

Thus it is that some wear the humeral veil from the sacristy and vice versa. Others prefer the veil to be left on the altar steps or on the altar itself, so that the priest may manipulate it himself. Both courses are outside the situation as envisaged by the rubrics and, as

a substitute for the prescribed practice, each has its advantages.

Similarly, it is the practice in some places for the Sister to remove the humeral veil from the priest's shoulders when he arrives at the sick-room. She also replaces it on his shoulders when he is about to complete the ceremony in that room. Some, no doubt, would condemn this practice for the same reason that they do not permit a Sister, carrying a candle and tinkling a bell, to precede the priest. They contend that in this way a woman comes to have part in a liturgical function. This argument, however, does not definitely establish either contention for the reason, already stated, that the Ritual presupposes the presence of clerics, and in their absence some improvisation is inevitable.

The humeral veil should, strictly speaking, be resumed in order to carry the ciborium from one room to another. Seeing that the Sister is thus obliged to intervene repeatedly, it may be deemed preferable that the humeral veil be left off until it is time to return to the altar. In view of these difficulties, some justify the practice, referred to by our correspondent, of wearing the veil throughout the distribution of Holy Communion.

2. The server should take the veil immediately to the side-table or bench. There is no solid reason why he should remain kneeling or standing until the Divine Praises have been recited. Reverence due to the Blessed Sacrament exposed on the altar cannot be the reason, for a certain amount of movement is incidental to any ceremony. Nor can it reasonably be claimed that the server's movement is a distraction to the priest or the faithful in reciting the Divine Praises.

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III.—PRONOUNCING WORDS OF CONSECRATION AT MASS.

Dear Rev. Sir,

What obligation is there on the priest celebrating Mass to pronounce the words of Consecration loud enough to be heard by himself?

Would a similar obligation apply to the words of sacramental absolution?

SACERDOS.

REPLY.

The rubrics of the Missal prescribe that the words of Consecration must be pronounced "*Secrete, distincte et attente*" (Consecration of Host), "*attente, continuate et secrete*" (Consecration of Chalice). The exact meaning of "*secrete*" as opposed to "*clara voce*" is defined in the *Rubricae Generales Missalis*: *Quae vero secrete dicenda sint, ita pronuntiet, ut et ipsemet se audiat et a circumstantibus non audiat*. The celebrant should so enuntiate these words that he shall hear himself but shall not be heard by those assisting at Mass, unless they are close to the altar. This rule assumes, of course, that no impediment such as deafness is to be taken into account on the part of the priest.

Some rubrics are preceptive, others merely directive. The former impose an obligation in conscience, the latter, *per se*, do not involve any more than an instruction or direction to the priest. As a general rule, rubrics which regulate prayers and ceremonies which take place *within* the Mass are considered to be preceptive. Their binding force is *sub gravi* or *sub levi* according to the matter involved. Some relevant considerations in determining the gravity of the obligation are: (1) the degree of irreverence involved; (2) the greater or less solemnity of that part of the Mass in which the rubric applies; (3) the more or less serious character of the breach.

In regard to the words of Consecration, however, the obligation of the priest to pronounce the words in the manner described is more than that which arises from the rubrics of the Missal. In this case the obligation is undoubtedly a grave one. For the words of Consecration constitute the form of the sacrament of the Eucharist. They must, therefore, be pronounced "*modo sensibili*" as a condition of the validity of the sacrament. If, then, the celebrant pronounces the words so inaudibly that he is unable to hear them himself, he is endangering the validity of the sacrament.

A similar obligation binds the priest in regard to the words of sacramental absolution. They constitute the form of the sacrament of Penance, and so the same argument is applicable.

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IV.—COMMUNION OF THE SICK AND EUCHARISTIC FAST.

Dear Rev. Sir,

With regard to the privilege granted to sick people of receiving Holy Communion twice a week after having taken liquid food, would

this apply to old and infirm people who are able to attend Mass in the chapel, but owing to some throat infection find it necessary to take a drink of water beforehand?

CHAPLAIN.

REPLY.

The faculty in question is contained in the Formula Maior, which was granted to the Ordinaries of this country by the S. Congregation of Propaganda on January 1st, 1941, to be valid for a period of ten years. The faculty may be subdelegated by the Ordinaries and, no doubt, is amongst the faculties granted to the priests of each diocese. (IV. Plenary Council, Append. X, n. 18). "Concedendi infirmis de quibus certa spes non adsit ut cito convalescant, ut S. Communionem sumere possint bis vel ter in hebdomada (et si agatur de sacerdotibus vel religiosis, etiam quotidie) etsi aliquam medicinam vel aliquid per modum potus antea sumpserint." (Formula Maior, n. 18). The case proposed by our correspondent is covered by the terms of this faculty.

It is already permitted in the law of the Code that sick people "qui jam a mense decumbunt" and who are without certain hope of recovering shortly may, on the prudent decision of their confessor, communicate once or twice in the week, although they have broken their fast by taking medicine or liquid food (aliquid per modum potus). Cn. 858, 2. This canon simply repeats the concession first granted by Pius X. in 1906. In virtue of the faculties granted to them in the Formula Secunda Maior, the Ordinaries of this country could permit such sick people to communicate even though they had not been sick for a month. Moreover, their powers were extended in regard to the frequency with which such Communion could be permitted—twice or three times in the week, daily in the case of priests and religious.

However, both the concession made in common law and the faculty conferred in the Formula Secunda Maior were somewhat restricted by reason of the term "decumbunt." Most commentators held that only those who were sick and abed were eligible to enjoy this concession. Some authorities, it is true, maintained that the favour could be extended to those who, though sick, were able to get up and even to attend a nearby church to receive Communion. However, this more benign interpretation remained doubtful.

The faculty granted in the Formula Maior simply omits the term "decumbentes." Whatever restriction was involved in its use has, therefore, been eliminated as far as this country is concerned. The

concession may now be made available to "infirmi de quibus spes non adsit ut cito convalescant."

The aged and infirm referred to in the query are therefore, eligible to enjoy this concession. All the requisite conditions are fulfilled; (1) they are "infirmi" (although not, perhaps, "decumbentes" in the sense of the previous faculty); (2) there is no certain hope of a quick recovery (i.e., within a few days); (3) they break the fast by taking liquid food.

It should be emphasised, however, that this is not a concession granted in common law, nor is it granted directly to sick people in virtue of the Formula Maior. They must be authorised to break the Eucharistic Fast in this way by the Ordinary or his delegate—in practice, by any priest who is attending the sick. Finally, it may be noted that Holy Communion is permitted under these conditions twice or three times in the week, and daily in the case of priests and religious.

JAMES CARROLL.

Notes

One manifestation of the liturgical movement of recent times is the interest taken in the laity's participation in the Mass. A recent writer (Dom Ryelandt, O.S.B., "Mass and the Interior Life," pp 31

sqq.) discusses the relation of Communion to the Sacrifice of the Mass, and brings forward several reasons why the reception of Holy Communion should be closely associated with the celebration of Mass. Such, he says, was the manner in which the Eucharist was instituted, such was the traditional practice of the Church. He claims that "a Catholic who, having assisted at the Sacrifice, approaches the altar, receives a portion of the Victim and consumes It, attests in the clearest manner his active participation in the mystery which has been celebrated." One might add that the example of the Last Supper would suggest that the faithful should partake of the Species *consecrated* in the Mass which they attend. St. Thomas has a passage which seems to suppose this: "...quia scilicet non debet pars hostiae consecratae de qua sacerdos et ministri vel etiam populus communicat, in crastinum reservari. Unde..Clemens I Papa statuit quod 'tanta holocausta in altari offerantur, quanta populo sufficere debeant; quod si remanserint, in crastinum non reserventur, set cum timore et tremore clericorum diligentia consumantur'." St. Thomas goes on to say: "Oportet alias hostias consecratas pro infirmis consecrare..".

On the other hand it is the frequent practice of the Church to-day to dissociate the reception of Holy Communion from the Mass. Communion is often given outside Mass, before Mass, and it is usual to consecrate ciboria which will suffice for the Communions at many Masses. This must be done, of course, in many cases, for example in public churches where the numbers of communicants are uncertain; but it is also the practice where the number is, within small limits, certain, as for example, in a small religious house. A ciborium is consecrated which will last for say a week, and Communion is distributed from it during the Mass each morning. Is this modern way of acting, then, in accordance with theological teaching? Would it be better for a priest, in the cases where it can be done, to consecrate each morning hosts for the communicants, rather than to consecrate a large ciborium

from which he would distribute Communion at Mass during the following days?

There are many points in our theology on the Mass which are doubtful. Several such are involved in this question. We shall have to refer to opinions which are not of faith, and on which theologians differ. Such opinions, it would seem, cannot usefully be preached; or at any rate, if they are preached, it would be necessary to make it clear that they rest on a different basis from the accepted doctrine of the Church. Without this qualification the faithful may be puzzled, or even scandalized at hearing different solutions.

Three points must be investigated in order to reply to the question asked:

1. How does the congregation participate in the Mass?
2. Do they participate more by receiving Holy Communion?
3. Do they participate more by receiving in Holy Communion a host consecrated at this Mass?

In the first question it will be well to recall two distinctions. The first regards the fruits of the Mass: These are either "*ex opere operantis*," from the good acts of the person offering and assisting at Mass; or "*ex opere operato*." This phrase, however, has not exactly the same meaning as used of the sacrifice and of the sacraments. In each case the effects are produced independently of the dispositions of the one who receives or performs the action, but while in the case of the sacraments the subject *receives* something, in the case of the Mass the independence consists in this that the sacrifice is the sacrifice of Christ and of the Church, in which Christ is the victim. In consequence effects are produced altogether surpassing the virtues and dignity of the human offerer. Lugo. De Euch. D.19.s.11.n.233,

Secondly, we must distinguish participation in the sacrificial action and in the sacrificial fruits. The sacrificial action is performed by the ordained priest, who from the sacrament of Orders and from the institution of the Church has the power of consecrating and of standing before God in the name of the Church. There is an essential difference from both of these heads between the celebrating priest and those assisting, however closely they may join him in their intention and devotion.

The sacrificial fruits are both "*ex opere operantis*," and "*ex opere operato*." The former may be directed as the fruits of our other good works. Thus Suarez, de Euch D.78 XI. n.6. "*Quilibet offerens, etiam non sacerdos, pro alio offerre potest....Hoc certum est de*

fructu ex opere operantis quantum ad fructum impetrationis et satisfactionis, qui de se aliis communicabilis est." The fruits "ex opere operato" are applied to various persons; to him for whom Mass is said, to all those present, to all the members of the Church, according to the intentions of the prayers of the Church and of the priest celebrating. It is the more generally received opinion of theologians that this application of the fruits "ex opere operato" can be made only by the celebrating priest. Suarez again, l.c. D.79 s.9. n.8., gives the arguments for both opinions. He submits as probable the opinion that private offerers may apply this fruit to others, in the same way as they may apply the fruit "ex opere operantis." "Whence can it be shown," he asks, "that Christ did not give them the power of communicating to others these fruits?" However, he thinks it more probable that such a power belongs only to the celebrating priest, and that the fruit which comes to one "ex opere operato" is as personal and inalienable as the effects of the sacraments.

All hold then, that all those who offer Mass, or assist at Mass, benefit themselves, and can benefit others in some way.

Secondly, does one who assists at Mass have a more intimate part in the offering and in the fruits if he receives Holy Communion? That he receives the sacramental grace is clear. But, besides this grace, does he offer Mass more perfectly, and does he have a greater share in the sacrificial fruits? In the concrete, if a person assists at Mass each morning, will he *assist* better and more fruitfully on the mornings on which he communicates?

We exclude at once an exaggeration of the Reformation. They maintained that no sacrifice was offered, but the faithful, as well as the priest, received Communion. Trent condemned this: "Si quis dixerit...quod offerri non sit aliud quam nobis Christum ad manducandum dari, A.S." (S.XXII.c.1.). The reception of Communion by the congregation, then, is not an essential part of the offering of Mass, nor of their fruitful assistance.

It will be profitable at this point, to examine briefly the idea of partaking of the victim of a sacrifice. It was certainly regarded as a participation in the ceremony. The words of St. Paul (i.Cor.X.vv. 18-21.) make this clear. Those who eat of the victims offered to pagan gods are "participes mensae daemoniorum." They cannot at the same time have a share in the Victim offered in the Christian sacrifice; "non potestis mensae domini participes esse."

This idea is developed by theologians in their discussion of the

notion of sacrifice. It can be seen, for instance, in a citation from Fr. de la Taille (*Mysterium Fidei*, *Elucid.* I. p.14): The participation of the victim offered to God is not a violation of the sacrifice, but a special sharing in it. "*Quae divinorum bonorum communicatio ad homines aptissime per convivium significabatur, quo Deus pasceret homines de cibis sibi ipsi propriis. Non enim tunc quasi ad vulgarem altaris mensam accedebant, sed sacram, sed divinam, convivae facti Dei, qui eos ad coenam suam vocaret, adscisceretque commensales.*" In this place, William of Paris is cited as drawing our attention to a social effect of such a participation: "*unam familiam spiritalem, unamque domum, maxime facit communio ciborum et potuum spiritualium.*"

When we come to examine more carefully what exactly this participation is, it becomes clear that it is a participation, not in the sacrificial action, but in the sacrificial fruits. This conclusion is borne out by the consideration that the sharing of the Victim supposes the sacrifice already completed. Furthermore, there were true sacrifices, such as the holocaust, of which those assisting did not in any way partake. Thus Suarez, in s.9 of his commentary on St. Thomas' *Summa* III.q.83.a.1., says: "*Nunquam est haec distributio (communio) pars sacrificii*"; i.e., of the sacrificial action. Those theologians who speak of this distribution as of the "perfection of the sacrifice," he says: "*non intelligunt de perfectione quasi intrinseca et constitutiva sacrificii, sed de extrinseca.*"

There is then a participation in the victim, and in the fruits of Mass by receiving Holy Communion. It seems to be something more than the sacramental grace of Holy Communion. It seems to be a greater participation, too, in the effects "*ex opere operato*" of the sacrifice which has been offered. On these points, however, we would hesitate to say anything more definite.

Thirdly, supposing that a person receives Holy Communion during Mass, will this participation be more immediate and fruitful if he receive a host consecrated at this Mass, than if he receive one from a ciborium previously consecrated? We set aside, at once, both the essential grace of the sacrament, which is always received in a good Communion; and the grace "*ex opere operantis*" of the communicant. This latter grace may easily be increased by receiving a host offered and consecrated at the Mass at which the communicant has assisted. Our answer to the second question was hesitant. So is our answer now, for again we cannot produce any certain reasons.

It is the common teaching that it is more correct to speak of "one sacrament of the Eucharist," than of many, as the sacrament consists of the Body and Blood of Christ, which is one in all the species. Thus Lugo, de Euch. D.2.s.21, gives as "mihi magis placet," the following: "Cum Eucharistia dicat in recto solum Corpus Christi, et non species, non erunt plures Eucharistiae multiplicatis speciebus, quia idem Corpus Christi sub omnibus continetur." He then quotes St. Paul, 1 Cor. X.17, "Omnes unum corpus sumus qui de uno pane participamus"; and holds that the unity is *numerical* not specific; "Ubi non de unitate specifica, ut aliqui volunt, sed de numerica debet intelligi." Suarez also thinks it better to speak of one than of many sacraments of the Eucharist: "Tertius modus dicendi *esse potest*, totum hoc sacramentum esse unum numere, et omnes species consecratis ubicumque et quomodocumque sint, esse unum numero sacramentum" (in Summam III.q.73.a.2). His reasons are those of Lugo, though in the end of the section he quotes St. Ambrose: "Unam esse hostiam, et non multas, quam Christus obtulit et omnes sacerdotes offerunt," and concludes "sicut ergo est idem *numero* sacrificium, ita est idem sacramentum." In these opinions, then, it would not seem to make any difference as to the participation in the fruits "ex opere operato," whether the host received was consecrated in this Mass or in another.

Fr. de la Taille has treated the question explicitly, and though his solution depends on his doctrine of the unity of the sacrifice of the Last Supper and the Mass, still it will be of interest generally. He distinguishes "reality" and "appearances." In reality, just as there is only one sacrifice, so, too, there is only one sacrament. "A coena usque ad finem mundi unum secundum veritatem decurrit panis et calix eucharisticus, per omnium sacerdotum manus atque ora fidelium." Myst. Fid. Elucid. 45.

In consequence, it makes no essential difference at what Mass the host received was consecrated. By partaking of it, the communicant has part in the one sacrament and the one sacrifice.

If, on the other hand, we look to appearances, there would seem to be many sacrifices, many sacraments. "Juxta quam considerationem, non eiusdem sacrificii particeps est qui ex hac alitur Missa, ac qui alitur ex illa." Nor are these appearances to be entirely set aside: "Non insulse fideles olim de suis sacrificiis (id est ex parte sua oblatis) potissimum solliciti erant depasci." We think we correctly represent Fr. de la Taille's opinion, by saying that this participa-

tion is more fruitful because the communicant has more interest in the sacrifice with which he is more connected, and therefore more devotion in receiving. There would then appear to be an increase in the sacrificial fruits "*ex opere operantis*."

So much for the theological and theoretical point of view. To deal more precisely with the question we have raised, we must note a few points. The citation from St. Clement is not from the one epistle of this pope which all admit to be certainly genuine. It and the citation from the *Summa* would point to a difference of discipline with regard to the reservation of the Blessed Sacrament. Both quotations testify that at the time they were written, reservation was only made for the sick. Bellarmine (*de Controv.* L.4.c.5) deals with this Clementine text, which was being brought forward against the Catholic practice of reservation. He says that the text does not forbid *all* reservation, and brings forward other texts from the Clementine writings which testify to the practice of reservation for the sick. It would appear, from this chapter of Bellarmine, that the Blessed Sacrament was in reality reserved also for many other uses. It was sent to bishops as a token of peace and communion, it was carried on journeys, etc. Capello (*de Sac.* I. n.342), thinks that the author of the Clementine citation forbade reservation through fear of desecration during the times of persecution.

Besides the practical considerations that inspire modern discipline on this matter, we think there are others which should not be neglected. It is difficult to see how a priest can be *sure* of the number of communions,—for example, in a religious house,—without drawing attention to anyone who might wish to abstain. In other words, such a practice increases the publicity of omitting Holy Communion. The Church has lately stressed the need for complete freedom in the reception of Holy Communion, and a special Instruction has been issued (cf. A.C.R. 1941, pp. 62 sqq.). Again, the Church is strict about the renewal of particles in the ciborium. If the ciborium were left in the Tabernacle and only used for the sick, a rare occurrence perhaps, might there not be danger that the renewal could be easily neglected?

It will appear then, in conclusion, that while theological considerations would incline us to consecrate particles for the communicants at each Mass, practical reasons of great weight will justify us, and frequently require us, to maintain the ordinary practice.

JEREMIAH HOGAN, S.J.

The practice of offering Holy Communion for a particular intention is one that has grown of late in the Church. The faithful offer their Holy Communions for the Souls in Purgatory. The rule of many religious communities and of pious associations prescribes it in certain circumstances. "Communions received" are blossoms that are found in most "Spiritual Bouquets." All this would a priori incline one to the conclusion that such a practice is "holy and wholesome."

On the other hand there are certain passages in dogmatic treatises that seem contrary. For example, St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa (3.q.79.a.ad.7) says: "Et ideo quod aliquis summit corpus Christi, vel etiam plures, non crescit aliis aliquod incrementum." And again in the same article: "Hoc sacramentum SUMMENTIBUS quidem prodest ET per modum sacramenti ET per modum sacrificii, in quantum pro salute eorum offertur. Unde in canone missae dicitur, 'Memento Domine...etc.'" All will admit that our prayers after Communion are of special value. Still, it seems to be the general conviction that to offer Holy Communion for another, means something more than to pray for him at a time when our prayers are very efficacious. Such a conviction has a dogmatic basis which may be worked out from the pages of such theologians as St. Thomas and Suarez. The faithful may not know the scientific form of the doctrine, but their conviction is in full conformity with theological principles.

The quotation from the Summa given above cannot, it would seem, be taken as meaning more than that no one except the actual participant can have a share in the special graces which the Blessed Eucharist causes *ex opere operato*. This is a principle generally applicable to the sacraments. Their effects, the remission of sin, increase of grace and glory, the bestowing of special powers or assistance, are all of their nature personal and inalienable. (Suarez de Euch. d.79,s.9,n.8.)

There is a second principle with regard to the sacraments from which the same conclusion can be drawn, namely, that they cause that grace which they signify. It is enunciated by Eugenius IV in the Decretum pro Armenis with special application to the Holy Eucharist. "This sacrament produces in relation to spiritual life, every effect which material food and drink produce in relation to bodily life,—sustaining, increasing, repairing and delighting." Food benefits only

the consumer. So, too, the sacramental grace of the Eucharist is of benefit only to him who actually eats and drinks the Body and Blood of Christ.

There is, however, in the act of the communicant, another aspect. Not only does he receive a sacrament, causing in himself sacramental effects *ex opere operato*; but, as well, he performs a good act, producing effects largely dependent on his own efforts and dispositions, or *ex opere operantis*. Such an act has an impetratory and satisfactory value. No reason can be seen why these cannot be communicated to others, and theologians have always held that such effects can be given to another. St. Thomas cannot have excluded this in P.III.q.79.a.7., as it can be seen that it follows from his doctrine in I.II.q.114.a.6. He is speaking of meriting for another a particular grace,—that of conversion, but his reasoning is quite general. “*Merito congrui, potest aliquis alteri mereri primam gratiam: quia enim homo in gratia constitutus implet Dei voluntatem, congruum est secundum amicitiae proportionem ut Deus impleat hominis voluntatem in salvatione alterius, licet quandoque possit habere impedimentum ex parte illius cuius aliquis sanctus justificationem desiderat.*”

St. Thomas' doctrine is developed by the theologians. Suarez (de Gratia L.XII.cc.32 sqq.) treats the matter at length. We reproduce briefly some points.

1. This winning grace for others is not by meritum “de condigno,” that is by means of merit which demands reward as of strict right. God has not given to men the power of meriting thus for others. That is a privilege granted only to Christ “in as much as He is the head of the Church and the author of our salvation.” (St. Thomas, I.II.q.114,a.6.)

2. However, our merit for others is a real merit, even though imperfect. Suarez (l.c.c.32), establishes this assertion as “*vera sententia et communis theologorum.*” It therefore has a claim on God for its reward, not indeed a claim in strict justice, but a claim which relies either on God's liberality, as some theologians hold, or on some species of justice, as Suarez himself thinks more likely. “It retains the form of justice in as much as it is on account of some kind of right to reward which is in these actions, and a certain fairness, (on God's side). in return for this service.” “*Servat modum iustitiae, quatenus respicit aliquale debitum in operibus fundatum, et acquitatem quamdam respectu illius observationis.*” l.c.c.36,n.11.

3. Both on this account, and because the other may be incapable or unworthy of the benefit, it follows that such effects are not infallibly produced.

It will also be of interest to consider briefly the conditions which the scholastic theologians commonly lay down as required for this merit. Suarez in the same Book XII of his Treatise on Grace makes it clear that less is required for this merit than for merit *de condigno*. The promise of God is required for the latter, not for the former. The action, which would produce merit *de congruo* must, however, be freely placed and good. There are many discussions as to whether it must be supernatural, and in what way. It is not necessary to enter upon them here, as the reception of Holy Communion certainly contains all that anyone requires.

We can deduce then, that as the act of receiving Communion has all the conditions required, the communicant can in this way benefit others.

There are many reasons why this way of helping others is particularly profitable to them. The acts of preparing, of receiving, and of thanksgiving, are all acts of very high dignity. They include some of the noblest acts man is capable of; sorrow for sin, desire of union with Christ, love of the humanity of Christ, and so on. Then, too, the close union with Christ which follows Holy Communion, makes our prayers at that time of more than ordinary value, so that the impetration which would normally accompany the reception of Communion for others, is of special efficacy for them.

The Eucharist, too, has a special power of uniting us to Christ. This union with the Head brings with it a closer union with His other members. "He who receives the Eucharist, enters into communion with the Church of Christ, militant, suffering and triumphant." (*Mysterium Fidei*, Elucid. 37.) The more we are united with Christ the more we are one with one another. It is fitting, then, that we should fortify this union by allowing others, too, to participate in the fruits of our Communion.

Lastly, there is yet another way in which our Holy Communion can benefit others. The Church has annexed indulgences to the reception of Holy Communion, and allows us to apply them to others.

The faithful, even those with no special training, have by their general adoption of this practice shown that they appreciate it. They may not be able to give a technical explanation, but the average good Catholic would understand that in receiving Communion for others, he

is sharing this good work with them, that he is interceding for them at a time when his prayers are of very special value, and that by this sharing of good things he is carrying out Christ's command to us to love one another.

JEREMIAH HOGAN, S.J.

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The Epistles and Gospels of our Sunday Masses are portions of the Sacred Scriptures that enter deeply into the spiritual life of all the faithful, and to let pass unchallenged the articles of Fr. O'Neill, S.J., published some time ago in the A.C.R. upon this subject, would seem to give approval to his criticisms and welcome to his amendments. Even the assertion that the present texts in the Missal are far from ideal does not sound a particularly friendly note towards our life's friend—the Missal. For the faithful and the clergy are much attached to the Missal because it elevates the soul to God day by day, and, together with the Ritual and Breviary, is the public stairway upon which the ordinary soul climbs to sanctity. Our affection for it in no way obscures our vision to its defects, but on the other hand, the clearer our vision, the more penetrating our understanding of it, the fewer defects do we find.

Before there is question of revision of the pericopae, we would do well to remember that it has, as no other liturgical book, been set before the faithful of the west for over fourteen centuries as the principal and official means of contact with the inspired word of God. To assert then that these readings need a drastic alteration is tantamount to saying that the Church has failed to give the best spirituality to be gleaned from Sacred Scripture. Rather than speak thus, we must admit that the Missal, and in particular that portion read on the Sundays and Holy days, when taken as a whole, is the best that the Holy Ghost can give to His Church for her spiritual food. If we do not acknowledge this, are we to conclude that we are so different from earlier ages of faith that we can receive little from them, but must fashion even our spiritual handbook anew? Such a modernistic outlook is certainly not to be encouraged either in prayer or anything else.

To say that the Holy Ghost has guided the compilation of the Missal is one thing, while to say that He chooses each individual text and its place in the book is quite another. It is thus conceivable, and

indeed true, that some few texts might be revised; but any wide alterations may not be embarked upon.

If alterations are to be made at all, the following should be amongst the guiding principles:

(a) The Missal is to be regarded as a complete book and the Sunday Masses as a part of it. Changes to Sunday Masses, therefore, should not disfigure the whole book for the sake of the part.

(b) To disfigure the Psalms and antiphons that are true responses to the lessons read, by changing these lessons, is wanton destruction of the harmony of thought often to be found throughout a Mass proper.

(c) The book that we are discussing is the *Roman Missal*; the liturgy of the Church of Rome, and, because it is such, we may not disregard historical and geographical details that have often influenced the choice of Scripture texts.

Thus, for example: To neglect the "stations" of the Missal in a revision is to neglect the historical background that is necessary to a wise revision. For instance: To delete the present Epistle for Sexagesima Sunday is to ignore the Station at St. Paul's and to disfigure the Mass texts—leaving the Collect and Gradual, especially the former, meaningless. Again: The Gospel for the Third Sunday of Lent about Satan being overcome by a stronger man, is most suitable when we see that the Station is at the Basilica of St. Lawrence, popularly honoured as the Standard-bearer of Christ's army capturing the pagan stronghold of Rome. Cardinal Schuster, O.S.B., says of this Gospel that "it could not be more appropriate"; while the suggested revision (A.C.R., 1941, p. 22) condemns it as "long obscure, of mixed content and otherwise lacking in appropriateness."

Moreover, through our liturgy, Rome is brought to occupy in the love and worship of Catholics the place that Jerusalem occupied in the love and worship of the Children of Israel; and thus is fostered in the faithful of the Roman rite loyalty and devotion to the authority of which the material city is ever a symbol.

(d) The twofold division of the temporal cycle of the Missal into the Christmas and the Easter Cycles has radically influenced the choice of Scripture texts for the liturgical year. And so let us be certain that any new or revised texts shall be suitable for the period in which they

occur. So far as we can judge from available documents at present, this seems to have been the dominating motive for the choice of our present pericopae.

With these four general rules indicated, we may now further enquire into the desired harmony or congruity of Epistle and Gospel. "Facing the two on any given Sunday, the preacher will constantly find that he cannot bring them into focus. Unless he strain to produce a forced harmony, he must elect to preach on one and ignore the other." (A.C.R., Oct., 1940, p. 283).

This is indeed true since connection between the two was not intended (with the exception of the "Stations" days, of Feast-days and of a few other Masses). The ordinary practice was to read the Lessons and the Gospel from different books, and independently of one another. In the times when two or five or twelve lessons were read before the Gospel, it would indeed have required great skill and imagination to choose texts harmonising with each other. Why "the harmony of Epistle and Gospel for Good Shepherd Sunday should be noted as one of the best liturgical arrangements we possess" I do not know. Were the lesson to be, as suggested in the previous articles, a tableau of the Gospel, we would reduce the didactic and homiletic value of the texts by half. At present, we have generally two separate and distinct instructions, and we are meant to choose one or other for our sermon, and only rarely both (*e.g.*, Second Sunday after Easter—"Good Shepherd Sunday"). Absence of congruity between Epistle and Gospel is then a blessing for the preacher; and if it happens that the Gospel is more frequently chosen for explanation, perhaps it is because the Epistle sometimes yields its treasures for instruction only after study and painstaking labour, while the Gospel is more obvious and simple.

That the Missal contains "regrettable omissions" is, of course, true, for its size is limited and there must be omissions, and even regrettable omissions. But when we consider the Missal as a complete book, we see that most of the books of the Scriptures are represented. The Old Testament figures on six days each week during Lent, on the Ember days and occasionally in the Sanctoral cycle; it is, however, absent from the Sunday Masses. This is perhaps not quite so regrettable an omission as it may at first appear. Have we not many verses of the Psalms still in the Missal, and does not St. Augustine declare that the Psalms are the epitome of the Old Testament? It is, therefore, not accurate to assert that "the entire Old Testament inspiration has fled

from our Sundays." The New Testament is the fulfilment of the Old, and, since frequent reference is made to the latter in our pericopae, an understanding of them involves with it a knowledge of the Old Testament read in other parts of the Missal. Finally, in regard to the absence of pericopae directly from the Old Testament in the Sunday Masses, we may remember that, though it was apparently by an accident that it ceased to be read, perhaps the Holy Ghost, the sanctifier of His Church, permitted such an accident for our own better sanctification. The souls of millions have not been undernourished by the absence of this spiritual food over a period of fourteen hundred years, for He Who is the Spirit of Holiness is also the Spirit of Wisdom, guiding the official book of reading and prayer that clothes the Bride of Christ with wisdom and holiness.

Those, then, who would set themselves to revise the Missal embark on a most difficult task. They must approach with reverence, prepared to change little in this book that is substantially the same since the days of St. Gregory. For it has upon it the seal of the Holy Ghost, and for its fruits the sanctity and the saints of fourteen centuries of Christian life.

"ROMANUS."

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Correspondence

In the april issue of the "Record" we published a letter which reached us from Brisbane, bearing a signature which purported to be that of Father J. Tamulis. Since publication, Father Tamulis has written: "I would deem it a great favour if you would kindly deny my authorship."

THE EDITOR.

Book Reviews

THE MASS AND OTHER POEMS; by Mary King. Pp. 40. Price 2/-. E. J. McAlister & Co., Adelaide, 1942.

It is good to know that there are Australians who feel the need of expressing themselves in verse. For it means that we are gradually evolving an Australian culture. And it is good to know that among these there are many Catholics. For it gives good hope that our Australian culture will ultimately be a truly Catholic culture.

A culture of permanent worth cannot be produced artificially. That is why I like the book of verses before me. One feels that the authoress wrote them simply because she wanted to write them—not to win a place among a coterie of snobs (as some among the most lauded of modern English poets seem to have done), nor yet to gain the praise of literary critics. It is by such natural products as these verses that our culture will really advance.

It is inevitable that verses written thus should vary in quality; and any collection of verses varies in its attractiveness to a particular individual. "Martha and Mary" I thought the best poem in the book: a vivid imagination, a keen sense of rhythm, and naturalness in choice of word, have produced as delightful a picture of the Bethany incident as I remember to have seen. Quite different is the five-lined "Stray Thought of a Convert," epigrammatic in its brevity and neatness, and yet warm with emotion. As warmly personal, but different in texture and content is "Lord, Thou hast a Million Stars." Different again is the carol, "Mary of Bethlehem," written with the same joy and simplicity as marks the mediæval carols. The last poem in the book, "The Bereaved," is more topical and sombre; in its second and third stanzas especially it strikes the genuine tragic note.

There are thirty-nine poems in all. Many of the rest fall below the standard of these five, some considerably below. But he who is deterred by that will be the loser. For he will miss the many good things this book contains.

E.G.

THE ALTAR SERVER. By Rev. Bernard O'Connor. Pp. 80; 1/6. Pellegrini & Co.

This is second edition of a valuable manual first published in 1930. It contains in an easy and readable form the information needed to enable the youthful server to perform his various duties intelligently. Moreover, the book breaths a spirit of piety, and the prayers suggested for those times when the server is not occupied should do much to foster real devotion. The responses are printed in bold type and are accompanied by full directions as to what the server is to do at the different portions of the Mass. Besides the Serving of Low Mass, we have an account of how to serve Mass for a Bishop, what is to be done at a Marriage Ceremony and a Nuptial Mass, the duties of the lower ministers at High Mass, the rite to be observed at Communion outside Mass and at Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Teachers and others, whose duty it is to train altar boys, will find this book most helpful.

J.M.